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Addiction and Expression 
by LUKE MORGAN* 
Introduction 
On September 9, 2014, video game developer Bungie, Inc. released its 
much-anticipated game, Destiny.1  Bungie was the creator of the massively 
popular and critically acclaimed Halo series, and Destiny’s release across 
four consoles was expected to be the studio’s return to the pinnacle of the 
gaming world.2  The game mixed Tolkeinesque high fantasy with futuristic 
science fiction, and combined elements of two of the most popular genres of 
video games—Massive Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games 
(“MMORPGs”) and First-Person Shooters (“FPS”).3  The studio even hired 
Peter Dinklage, a star of HBO’s Game of Thrones, to voice a main character.4  
The game’s overall budget was more than $500 million.5  Then, something 
strange happened. 
It rapidly became apparent that, despite strong sales numbers,6 Destiny 
was not much fun to play.  A representative review began: “It’s impossible 
 
 *  J.D., 2019, Duke University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Indiana University.  I am grateful 
to Rachel Smith for her encouragement and subject-matter expertise, and to Professor Joseph 
Blocher for his invaluable feedback and guidance, which markedly improved this Article.  I also 
thank the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their thoughtful feedback and 
editing. 
 1.  Sean Hollister, Bungie will release ‘Destiny’ on September 9th, 2014, VERGE (Dec. 6, 
2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/12/6/5183874/bungie-will-release-destiny-on-september-
9th-2014. 
 2.  Seth G. Macy, Activision: Destiny To Be ‘Best-Selling New Video Game IP in History,’ 
IGN (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.ign.com/articles/2014/02/06/activision-blizzard-announces-bett 
er-than-expected-earnings. 
 3.  See Adi Robertson, Bungie melds fantasy, Tarkovsky, and space wizards in ‘Destiny’ 
concept art, VERGE (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/3/28/4158802/bungie-
shows-off-destiny-concept-art-at-gdc (noting the combination of MMO and RPG elements and 
quoting Bungie as describing the game’s thematic genre as “mythic science fiction”). 
 4.  Cameron Kunzelman, Actually, Peter Dinklage Was Good in ‘Destiny’, VICE (Sept. 5, 
2017), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qvvqkb/actually-peter-dinklage-was-good-in-destiny. 
 5.  Eddie Makuch, Activision Investing $500 Million for Bungie’s Destiny, GAMESPOT (May 
6, 2014), https://www.gamespot.com/articles/activision-investing-500-million-for-bungie-s-dest 
iny/1100-6419444/. 
 6.  See Jenna Pitcher, Destiny Sales Hit 6.3 Million Units within a Month of Release, IGN 
(Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.ign.com/articles/2015/09/08/destiny-sales-hit-63-million-units-wit 
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to pinpoint an exact moment where Destiny broke my heart.  The 30-plus 
hours I’ve spent in the game so far have been a slow rollout of small 
disappointments, each adding up to a growing sense of the emptiness at 
Destiny’s core.”7  An early post-mortem by the popular gaming site Kotaku 
notes: “[T]here was much to criticize . . . .  [P]laying Destiny felt like battling 
against the developers themselves.”8  Bungie had internally predicted an 
average Metacritic score of 90; once the chips fell, Destiny garnered a score 
of 76 from the review aggregation site.9 
Of course, reviewers are not necessarily players.  But gamers were 
unhappy, too.  The “DestinyTheGame” subreddit quickly became a major 
social hub for the game’s players.  There, posts castigating Destiny’s 
fundamentals were mainstays on the front page.  One popular post addressed 
to Bungie notes: “Destiny is not difficult.  Its tedious.”10  The poster notes 
trudging through the main storyline in hopes of “hit[ting] the content we both 
know [Bungie] can do,” but, upon completing the main story, finding the 
“real game”: an “[e]ndless fucking grind for gear that never drops.”11 
Destiny’s underperformance, and the discontent of its players, is not, by 
itself strange. Anyone, even an industry darling like Bungie, can flop.  What 
was strange about Destiny is that, despite the shared sense that the game was 
fundamentally not fun, people kept playing: “I’m a bit over 600 hours in, and 
still can’t figure out what I see in the game (at this point),” reported one 
player.12  Another: “Destiny has totally consumed my life.”13  A third: “My 
[girlfriend] hates this game, hates watching me play it, and I feel like its [sic] 
starting to affect our [r]elationship. Now the easy answer would be: ‘Bro, 
just quit the game.’ but that’s NOT GUNNA HAPPEN!!”14 One popular 
 
hin-a-month-of-release/ (“[P]re-release and first-day orders reached USD $500 million.”).  
 7.  Philip Kollar & Arthur Gies, Destiny Review: No Fate, POLYGON (Sept. 12, 2014), 
https://www.polygon.com/2014/9/12/6138497/destiny-review-no-fate. 
 8.  Jason Schreier, The Messy, True Story Behind The Making of Destiny, KOTAKU (Oct. 20, 
2015), https://kotaku.com/the-messy-true-story-behind-the-making-of-destiny-1737556731. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  /u/Tutsks, Bungie? Destiny is not difficult. Its [sic] tedious., REDDIT (Oct. 29, 2014), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/DestinyTheGame/comments/2knqsv/bungie_destiny_is_not_difficult_it
s_tedious/. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  /u/wax66, Comment to Confessions of a Destiny Addict, REDDIT (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/DestinyTheGame/comments/2smo4d/confessions_of_a_destiny_addict/
cnqwt70/. 
 13.  /u/SoulRebel726, Comment to Confessions of a Destiny Addict, REDDIT (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/DestinyTheGame/comments/2smo4d/confessions_of_a_destiny_addict/
cnqvy16/. 
 14.  /u/LiquidRazor, Is This Game Ruining Your Relationships With Friends, Family, or 
Significant Others, REDDIT (Dec. 30, 2014), https://www.reddit.com/r/DestinyTheGame/comm 
ents/2quhkn/is_this_game_ruining_your_relationships_with/. 
1 - MORGAN FINAL 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:20 PM 
Winter 2020] ADDICTION AND EXPRESSION 199 
discussion post, since deleted, asks: “Are we actually having fun or are we 
just addicted?”15  A user responded: 
 
Honestly, im [sic] just addicted.  I dont [sic] even know what im 
[sic] chasing any more, and I just get upset at the game, the rewards 
I get that are worthless . . . im [sic] never happy with my time on it 
but im [sic] still playing. And reading through this thread was so 
depressing, half of us sound like battered wives married to Bungie 
swearing they’ll change.16 
 
Less anecdotal data is available thanks to “WastedOnDestiny.com,” 
which mines the game’s publicly available data to allow players to discover 
exactly how much time they have “wasted” on Destiny.17  As of May 26, 
2019, the top Destiny player in terms of hours played had spent 13,423 hours 
on Destiny, and 9,033 hours on Destiny 2.18  The Destiny total alone is 559 
days’ worth of playing time.  There is some speculation that this player uses 
a bot to run the game without actually playing;19 but even the third-highest 
through tenth-highest players20 averaged 312 days’ worth of playing time in 
less than five years since Destiny’s release.21  Bungie itself reported an 
average daily playtime of three hours.22 
 
 15.  /u/Uknowlikewhatever, Are we actually having fun or are we just addicted?, REDDIT 
(via Archive.org) (Mar. 15, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150321000051/https:// 
www.reddit.com/r/DestinyTheGame/comments/2z3w3j/discussion_are_we_actually_having
_fun_or_are_we/. 
 16.  /u/tibbers_and_annie, Comment to Are we actually having fun or are we just addicted?, 
REDDIT (via Archive.org) (Mar. 15, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150321000051/ 
https://www.reddit.com/r/DestinyTheGame/comments/2z3w3j/discussion_are_we_actually_havin
g_fun_or_are_we/. 
 17.  About, TIME WASTED ON DESTINY, https://www.wastedondestiny.com/about (last visited 
May 26, 2019). 
 18.  Leaderboard, TIME WASTED ON DESTINY (last visited May 26, 2019), https://www. 
wastedondestiny.com/leaderboard. 
 19.  /u/KissellJ, /u/Radiatin, /u/Javamellow, Comments to Stat of the Day: G-Money876 has 
played 1 yr, 32 weeks, 3 days, and 6 hours worth of Destiny!, REDDIT (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www. 
reddit.com/r/DestinyTheGame/comments/5vswrj/stat_of_the_day_gmoney876_has_played_1_yr
_32/. 
 20.  I have excluded the second-highest player from this calculation because, with 12,924 
hours played, that user’s playing time is closer to the suspected bot-user than to the third-highest 
player, who has 10,418 hours played.  By contrast, player number thirty, at 7,081 hours, is relatively 
close to player number ten, who has 8,065 hours played.  Leaderboard, TIME WASTED ON DESTINY, 
https://www.wastedondestiny.com/leaderboard (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 21.  Though, because most Destiny players left for Destiny 2 in September 2017, much of 
those 312 days likely came in the first three years of Destiny’s existence. 
 22.  Casidee Moser, Bungie Used Behavioral Psychology to Make Destiny Appealing, IGN 
(Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.ign.com/articles/2015/04/02/bungie-used-behavioral-psychology-to-
make-destiny-appealing. 
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What few players realized was that—although Bungie would have of 
course preferred that players enjoyed the game—the compulsion they felt to 
play despite the frustration was an intended function. 
In April 2015, John Hopson, then the “head of user research” for 
Bungie, and the holder of a doctorate in behavioral and brain sciences,23 
spoke to the 2015 Game Developer Conference (“GDC”).24  There, he 
revealed how Bungie “so carefully created a game meant to hook players and 
keep them coming back time after time.”25  He proceeded to lay out the 
“behavioral game design”26 that guided Destiny’s development from the 
beginning.27 
Hopson’s work with Bungie was informed by his “highly influential 
article,” Behavioral Game Design,28 and a lecture he gave on the topic at the 
2012 GDC.29  Behavioral Game Design offered its readers “recipes” for 
“[h]ow to make players play hard,” and “[h]ow to make players play 
forever.”30 
In his 2012 lecture, Hopson says the quiet part loud.  Referencing 
“variable ratio contingencies”—essentially, random chances at receiving a 
reward upon the completion of an activity—Hopson notes that this design 
choice produces “a high, consistent rate of activity.”31 He goes on: 
 
The classic example of this that hopefully none of you know too well 
is the slot machine.  So every time you pull the handle of the slot 
machine, there is a chance of winning, there is a chance of getting a 
reward on that pull.  You don’t have to pull ten times before you get 
something.  That first pull could win you the jackpot.  And that’s 
what produces this incredibly high, powerful rate of activity. . . .  So, 
this is a good thing in that there’s a high level of activity, there’s a 
high level of interest, it’s very motivating, it’s very addictive, as 
anyone who has played slots or gambled in any other way can tell 
you.32 
 
 23.  John Hopson, ASS’N FOR BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS INT’L., https://www.abainterna 
tional.org/constituents/bios/johnhopson.aspx (last visited May 26, 2019). 
 24.  Moser, supra note 22. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Game Developers Conference, User Research on Destiny, YOUTUBE (Apr. 8, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izZcrG4WqGI. 
 28.  JOEL BAKAN, CHILDHOOD UNDER SIEGE: HOW BIG BUSINESS TARGETS YOUR 
CHILDREN 23 (2011); John Hopson, Behavioral Game Design, GAMASUTRA (Apr. 27, 2001), 
https://w ww.gamasutra.com/view/feature/131494/behavioral_game_design.php. 
 29.  John Hopson, Behavioral Game Design, GDCVAULT (2004), https://www.gdcvault. 
com/play/1016539/Behavioral-Game. 
 30.  Hopson, supra note 28. 
 31.  Hopson, supra note 29, at 10:50. 
 32.  Id. at 11:00 (emphasis added). 
1 - MORGAN FINAL 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:20 PM 
Winter 2020] ADDICTION AND EXPRESSION 201 
Hopson’s remarks reflect the new reality in an industry that has 
displayed an “increasing interest in applying insights from psychology and 
behavioral economics to games.”33  By highlighting the parallels to 
gambling, though, they also reflect the danger that developers face. Unlike 
video games, gambling has historically been heavily regulated.34  To the 
extent that developers seek to use neuroscientific insights to “exploit[] 
players’ cognitive biases and predictably irrational behavior to make more 
money,”35 they run the risk of drawing the attention of regulators. 
But, in one crucial way, video games stand apart from gambling and 
other well-known and heavily regulated addictive products like alcohol or 
tobacco.36  Video games are speech protected by the First Amendment.37  
And the looming presence of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
tends to smother prospective regulation.38  Unsurprisingly, video games 
remain largely unregulated. 39 
But video games like Destiny are merely an easy entrance into the much 
larger phenomenon of addictive expression.  From ear-wormy pop music40 
to made-for-Netflix digital television shows designed to be consumed in ten-
hour-increments,41 to the growing problem of pornography addiction,42 
 
 33.  José P. Zagal, Staffan Björk & Chris Lewis, Conference Paper, Dark Patterns in the 
Design of Games, FOUNDS. OF DIGITAL GAMES 1, 6 (2013), https://gup.ub.gu.se/file/101018.  
 34.  Pete Williams, Supreme Court Allows Sports Betting Across the Country, NBC NEWS 
(May 14, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-allows-sports-
betting-across-country-n868956. 
 35.  Zagal, Björk & Lewis, supra note 33. 
 36.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (describing 
tobacco’s “unique political history); id. at 181-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing history of 
tobacco legislation); e.g., Lauren H. Greenberg, Note, The “Deeming Rule”: The FDA’s 
Destruction of the Vaping Industry, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (2018). 
 37.  Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“California correctly 
acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection.”). 
 38.  See Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1199, 1209 (2015) (describing the First Amendment as the frequent “designated vehicle” for 
“antiregulatory impulses”).  This is particularly true when it comes to video game regulations.  
See Neils Clark, Video Game Regulation: Where We Are Now, GAMASUTRA (Jan. 20, 2009), 
https://www.gamasutra.com/view/feature/132300/video_game_regulation_where_we_.php?
page=2 (“The ESA has been knocking down state laws, specifically in Illinois, Michigan, and 
Louisiana, put in place for regulating the sale of video games to minors. The ESA has yet to 
lose a case . . . .”). 
 39.  See generally Jeffrey O’Holleran, Note, Blood Code: The History and Future of Video 
Game Censorship, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 571 (2010).  
 40.  See TEDx Talks, Pop Music is Stuck on Repeat | Colin Morris | TEDxPenn, YOUTUBE 
(June 14, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tjFwcmHy5M (“Borrowing from the areas 
of bioinformatics and compression algorithms, he shows that the lyrics of pop songs have become 
substantially more repetitive over the decades.”). 
 41.  See infra note 267. 
 42.  See infra Part I.C.2. 
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expressive products increasingly rely on neuroscientific insights and 
behavioral psychology to “hook” their users.43 
There is no good reason to protect addictive “speech.”  It actively 
undermines the values that the First Amendment exists to promote and plays 
no essential part in the exposition of ideas.  The First Amendment “was 
meant for better things.”44 
Part I explores the science of addiction, and the growing practice of the 
intentional design of expressive products to produce addiction, with a 
particular focus on video games and pornography.  Part II argues that the 
First Amendment should not be interpreted to prohibit regulations narrowly 
aimed at the addictive properties of expressive products.45 
I. Addiction 
This Part sets forth a primer on the history and science of addiction, 
especially behavioral addictions.  It then discusses the history of the 
regulation of addictive products.  Finally, it analyzes the early research on 
behavioral addictions linked to video games and pornography. 
A. The Evolving Understanding of Addiction 
1. A Brief History of Addiction 
Addiction can be a surprisingly tricky concept to pin down.  As used in 
antiquity, addictus (or addicio) represented a “‘giving over’” of oneself.46  It 
had both positive and negative usages.  Negatively, it was the name given to 
the sentence levied against a debtor who was “given over to a master to repay 
his debts with his work,”47 i.e., a debt slave.48  But in the more common, 
positive sense, addicio meant something akin to devotion.49  This definition 
 
 43.  See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 45.  The scope of the inquiry here is relatively narrow.  I do not argue that video games and 
pornography should be removed from the ambit of First Amendment coverage.  Rather, the narrow 
bits of speech that are intended to produce addiction rather than to advance ideas should not be 
protected speech. 
 46.  Bruce Alexander & Anton Schweighofer, Defining “Addiction”, 29 CANADIAN PSYCH. 
151, 151 (1988). 
 47.  Marc-Antoine Crocq, Historical and Cultural Aspects of Man’s Relationship with 
Addictive Drugs, 9 DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 355, 359 (2007). 
 48.  Alexander & Schweighofer, supra note 46, at 151.  The notion of addiction as slavery has 
carried into modern usage.  See, e.g., ROBERT L. DUPONT, CHEMICAL SLAVERY: UNDERSTANDING 
ADDICTION AND STOPPING THE DRUG EPIDEMIC (2018). 
 49.  Alexander & Schweighofer, supra note 46, at 152.  The first definition for “addiction” in 
Noah Webster’s 1828 Dictionary reflected this usage: “The act of devoting or giving up in practice; 
the state of being devoted.”  Addiction, NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (1828).  
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did not die with Rome.  Indeed, “the uses of ‘addiction’ in Shakespeare, 
Hobbes, and Gibbon suggests that the unfavourable sense was less common 
than the favourable or neutral usage.”50 
This idiosyncratic historical usage reflects the fact that, while the “[u]se 
of alcohol and psychoactive drugs was well known throughout Western 
history . . . drug addiction was not a matter of sustained concern to either 
physicians or moralists before the 19th century.”51 
That was to change.  The 19th and 20th centuries “witnessed an 
extended moral panic” about the excessive use of alcohol and other drugs.52  
The neutral or positive sense of “addiction” was a casualty of that panic, as 
the term was “gradually medicalized, moralized, and restricted to alcohol 
and drugs.”53 
Until very recently, that hegemony held: addiction was about substance 
abuse.  For instance, Merriam-Webster defined “addiction” as a “compulsive 
need for and use of a habit-forming substance (such as heroin, nicotine, or 
alcohol) characterized by tolerance and by well-defined physiological 
symptoms upon withdrawal.”54  This hegemonic definition has coalesced 
into “The Official View of Addiction,” which has as its foundational premise 
that “addiction is fundamentally a problem of drug or alcohol 
consumption.”55 
2. Behavioral Addictions 
That definition has proven untenably narrow, thanks to growing 
recognition that “[s]everal behaviors, besides psychoactive substance 
ingestion, produce short-term reward that may engender persistent behavior 
despite knowledge of adverse consequences.”56  The American Society of 
Addiction Medicine’s formal definition of “addiction,” as revised in 2011, 
reads: “Addiction is a primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, 
memory and related circuitry.  Dysfunction in these circuits leads to 
 
 50.  Alexander & Schweighofer, supra note 46, at 152.  Compare William Shakespeare, 
Othello, act 2, sc. 2 (“It is Othello’s pleasure, our noble and valiant general, that . . . every man put 
himself into triumph, some to dance, some to make bonfires, each man to what sport and revels his 
addiction leads him.”), with William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, act 2, sc. 5 (“[H]e will smile upon 
her, which will now be so unsuitable to her disposition, being addicted to a melancholy as she is, 
that it cannot but turn him into a notable contempt.”). 
 51.  Bruce K. Alexander, The Rise and Fall of the Official View of Addiction, BRUCE K. 
ALEXANDER (July 3, 2014), http://www.brucekalexander.com/articles-speeches/277-rise-and-fall-
of-the-official-view-of-addiction-6. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 13 (10th ed. 1999). 
 55.  Alexander, supra note 51. 
 56.  Jon E. Grant et al., Introduction to Behavioral Addictions, 36 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL 
ABUSE 233, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3164585/. 
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characteristic biological, psychological, social and spiritual manifestations.  
This is reflected in an individual pathologically pursuing reward and/or relief 
by substance use and other behaviors.”57 
Currently, most behavioral addictions are not yet classified as full-
fledged addictions in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (“DSM”), but are 
instead termed “impulse control disorders.”58  But the most recent DSM 
(“DSM-V”) lists one entry in a new category on behavioral addictions: 
gambling disorder.59  This inclusion “reflect[s] research findings that 
gambling disorder is similar to substance-related disorders in clinical 
expression, brain origin, comorbidity, physiology, and treatment.”60  
Elsewhere, in a section designated for disorders that “require further research 
before their consideration as formal disorders,” DSM-V lists “Internet 
gaming disorder.”61 
Although, as the DSM-V suggests, further research is necessary, early 
research reliably demonstrates that behavioral addictions substantially 
mirror substance-based addictions.  Indeed, they share an “essential feature”: 
“the failure to resist an impulse, drive, or temptation to perform an act that 
is harmful to the person or to others.”62  Additionally, both behavioral and 
substance-based addictions “have onset in adolescence and young 
adulthood,” and “may exhibit chronic, relapsing patterns, but with many 
people recovering on their own without formal treatment.”63 
Behavioral addictions also track the lifecycle of substance-based 
addictions.  At the onset, the addiction is “preceded by feelings of ‘tension 
or arousal before committing the act’ and ‘pleasure, gratification or relief at 
the time of committing the act.’”64  Later, “the behavior . . . itself becomes 
less pleasurable and more of a habit or compulsion, or becomes motivated 
less by positive reinforcement and more by negative reinforcement.”65 
Like substance-based addictions, behavioral addictions inflict serious 
harms on their victims and on others, including financial or relationship 
problems and “frequent[] commi[ssion of] illegal acts, such as theft, 
 
 57.  Public Policy Statement: Definition of Addiction, AM. SOC. OF ADDICTION MED., 
http://www.asam.org/for-the-public/definition-of-addiction (last visited May 26, 2019) 
(emphasis added). 
 58.  Grant et al., supra note 56, at 2. 
 59.  Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://www.psychiat 
ry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Substance-Use-Disorder.pdf 
(last visited May 26, 2019). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Grant et al., supra note 56, at 2. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 3. 
 65.  Id. 
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embezzlement, and writing bad checks, to either fund their addictive 
behavior or cope with the consequences of the behavior.”66 
Perhaps most importantly for present purposes, behavioral addictions 
and substance addictions share “[c]ommon [n]eurobiological [p]rocesses,” 
or “shared neurocircuitry.”67  Particularly, in both behavior and substance 
addicts, “serotonin, which is involved with inhibition of behavior,” and 
“dopamine, involved with . . . motivation[] and the salience of stimuli, 
including rewards,” work in cohesion to alter addicts’ brain chemistry.68  
“Alterations in dopaminergic pathways have been proposed as underlying 
the seeking of rewards (e.g., gambling, drugs) that trigger the release of 
dopamine and produce feelings of pleasure.”69 
B. The Regulation of Addiction 
1. Ancient Addiction 
Humans have an extensive history with addictive substances.  The 
earliest confirmed alcoholic drink, for instance, was consumed in the Yellow 
River Valley of China around 7000-6600 BCE, and alcohol consumption 
appears to have been widespread by the third or fourth millennium BCE.70  
As for other drugs, it is “likely that the use of psychoactive plants pre-dates 
the use of fermented beverages” because the production of alcohol required 
certain technological advances, while psychoactive plants are traditionally 
consumed raw.71  While it is extraordinarily difficult to determine exactly 
how ancient the relationship between humans and psychoactive plants is, the 
discovery of such substances in a burial cave in Northern Iraq dating to 
around 60,000 BCE provides an example of the timelines being discussed.72 
These were not isolated experiments by prehistoric hippies. “[A]s soon 
as . . . drug plants were first consumed, there is uninterrupted evidence for 
such use over centuries,” and, in some cases, millennia.73  As humans 
gradually transitioned from nomadic hunter-gatherer tribes to stationary 
agricultural societies, and more complex social structures and governments 
developed, the relationship between individuals and addictive substances 
would become a matter of social concern.74  In particular, “alcohol abuse was 
 
 66.  Grant et al., supra note 56, at 2.  
 67.  Id. at 5. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Elisa Guerra-Doce, Psychoactive Substances in Prehistoric Times: Examining the 
Archaeological Evidence, 8 TIME & MIND 91, 95 (2015). 
 71.  Id. at 94-95. 
 72.  Id. at 97. 
 73.  Id. at 102. 
 74.  Indeed, addiction could be a matter of world-historical concern.  For example, some 
historians claim that Alexander the Great’s early death was related to his heavy alcohol 
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a social problem in the ancient world.”75  The Roman physician Aulus 
Cornelius Celsus officially categorized alcohol addiction as a disease.76 
Going hand-in-hand with the problem of addiction were attempts to 
address the social ills that it engendered.  For instance, since antiquity, those 
guilty of “antisocial or criminal acts while drunk were punished more strictly 
than others”—in some cases, drunkenness could double the penalty for a 
crime, or raise it from a misdemeanor to a felony.77  Hashish users in 14th-
century Ottoman-ruled Egypt had their teeth pulled.78  In the 17th century, 
under Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov, the first Russian Tsar, tobacco 
smokers risked “having their lips cut,” and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 
Murad IV, beheaded smokers.79 
Criminal punishments also frequently targeted the producers of 
addictive products.  The same Ottoman Emir that pulled the teeth of hashish 
users in 14th-century Egypt imprisoned or executed hashish farmers.80  
Another common subset of regulations restricted the classes of persons able 
to consume addictive substances.  For instance, in many ancient Greek cities, 
minors were “strictly prohibited” from consuming wine.81 
Humans have also encountered and dealt with behavioral addictions for 
millennia.  In the ancient Hindu epic The Mahabharata, authored around 400 
BCE, a central character gambles away his wealth and kingdom before 
gambling his brothers, his wife, and himself into servitude.82  And an 
archaeologist of ancient Rome, writing in 1892, notes: 
 
So intense was the love of the Roman for games of hazard, that 
wherever I have excavated the pavement of a portico, of a basilica, 
of a bath or any flat surface accessible to the public, I have always 
found gaming tables engraved or scratched on the marble or stone 
 
consumption.  See, e.g., Simon Denison, Was Alexander a Great Alcoholic?, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 
2, 1992), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/was-alexander-a-great-alcoholic-1537664.html 
(describing the work of a historian showing that Alexander displayed “all the classic symptoms of 
alcoholism,” and noting that even critics of the theory acknowledged that “many of Alexander’s 
contemporaries thought he drank too much”); but see, e.g., J. A. Liappas et al., Alexander the 
Great’s Relationship With Alcohol, 98 ADDICTION 561, 567 (2003) (“[T]he existing evidence does 
not support convincingly the idea that Alexander would be ‘diagnosed’ a posteriori as suffering 
from either dependence on or abuse of alcohol.”). 
 75.  Liappas et al., supra note 74, at 563. 
 76.  Crocq, supra note 47, at 358. 
 77.  Liappas et al., supra note 74, at 563. 
 78.  Crocq, supra note 47, at 357. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Liappas et al., supra note 74, at 563. 
 82. MAHABHARATA 96-101 (William Buck trans., U.C. Press 1973). 
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slabs, for the amusement of idle men, always ready to cheat each 
other out of their money.83 
 
The historian concludes that Mercury—the god of chance—“was 
worshipped in [Roman taverns] more than Bacchus”—the god of wine.84 
In confronting the harms posed by behavioral addictions—gambling in 
particular—ancient regulators were not unaware of the common relationship 
to substance-based addictions.  The Qur’an, for instance, “warns against both 
wine (khamr) and gambling (maisir) in the same” chapter.85  Accordingly, 
premodern societies confronted behavioral addictions in similar ways as they 
did substance-based addictions. 
In Rome, for instance, the “passion” for gambling was “so strong . . . 
and so heavy were the losses of many gamblers, that special laws were 
passed from time to time, by which the popular sport was declared a 
punishable offence” except during certain festivals, especially the 
Saturnalia.86  The games “became in the progress of time a most pernicious 
mania.  Magistrates tried to interfere, with little or no success.”87  Gradually, 
games of skill were almost entirely replaced with games of chance.88  The 
poet Horace lamented that “[t]he young Roman is no longer devoted to the 
manly habits of riding and hunting; his skill seems to develop more in the 
games of chance forbidden by law.”89 
Those convicted of gaming were required to pay four times the sum 
they had staked,90 although the laws were loosely enforced, especially as 
applied to old men.  After the republic had transitioned to empire, Claudius 
even wrote a treatise on the art of gambling and had a custom-built carriage 
that enabled him to gamble in transit.91  But as the empire waned, Justinian 
enacted a law absolutely prohibiting games of chance.92  Under this law, a 
 
 83.  Rodolfo Lanciani, Gambling and Cheating in Ancient Rome, 155 N. AM. REV. 97, 
97 (1892). 
 84.  Id. at 98-99. 
 85.  Crocq, supra note 47, at 358.  Sigmund Freud similarly argued in a letter to a 
contemporary that “masturbation is the one major habit, the ‘primal’ addiction,” and that substance-
based addictions emerge only as “a substitute and replacement” for that particular behavioral 
addiction.  Id. 
 86.  Lanciani, supra note 83, at 100. 
 87.  Id. at 102. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 103. 
 90.  WILLIAM SMITH, Alea, A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 74-75 (John 
Murray, London, 1875), http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIG 
RA*/Alea.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).  
 91.  Id.; see also Lanciani, supra note 83, at 105. 
 92.  Lanciani, supra note 83, at 105. 
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master or father had a remedy against any person who induced his servant or 
son to gamble.93 
Elsewhere, gambling regulations flourished as well.  One early 
American critic of gambling noted that, in early Jewish societies, “a gambler 
could not act as a magistrate, or occupy any high or honorable office, nor 
could he be a witness in any court of justice.”94  This may even understate 
the severity of the Jewish gambling prohibitions.  Some early Jewish scholars 
believed that gambling “was the main source of all calamities” befalling their 
communities, and thus proposed absolute bans.95  Gambling debts could not 
be collected in Jewish courts.96  Gamblers were, at times, prohibited from 
holding their weddings in synagogues.97  “[E]xcommunication and 
flagellation were commonly meted out to” those who violated the laws 
against gambling.98  All of these laws were enacted despite recognition of 
“the inability of the compulsive gambler to control his passion for the 
game.”99 
Similar stories can be drawn from independent societies across the 
globe.  Ancient Hindu society considered gambling to essentially be theft, 
and property won at gambling was conferred devoid of right to ownership; 
it was, therefore, subject to confiscation by the state.100  And “[g]ambling 
had been strictly prohibited throughout Chinese history,” with “severe 
punishments such as deportation and mutilation” imposed even into the 20th 
century.101  But, as with Rome, enforcement was weak, and “[g]ames such 
as dice and dominoes were popular among elites.”102 Addictive behavior, it 
turns out, is hard to stamp out. 
2. The American Experience 
Unsurprisingly, the American experience followed these familiar 
patterns.  Addictive substances—particularly alcohol and other drugs—and 
activities—particularly gambling—have been targeted for regulation since 
 
 93.  THE CIVIL LAW 83 (Samuel Parsons Scott trans., The Central Trust Company vol. 
4, 2001). 
 94.  JOHN PHILIP QUINN, FOOLS OF FORTUNE 71 (1892). Quinn colorfully added that “[s]uch 
disqualifications, at the present day, would largely decimate the judicial ranks and deplete the 
government roll.”  Id. 
 95. JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, Gambling, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/gambling 
(last visited June 18, 2019). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  MATTHEW STEWART, REMARKS ON THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE 134-35 (London, 
Richard and John Edward Taylor 1850). 
 101.  Anise M. S. Wu & Joseph T. F. Lau, Gambling in China: Socio-Historical Evolution and 
Current Challenges, 110 ADDICTION 210, 211 (2014). 
 102.  Id. 
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European countries first established colonies in North America.  The 
descendants of those regulations remain in place today. 
a. Alcohol, Tobacco, and the Game-Changing Understanding of Addiction 
Two addictive substances, alcohol and tobacco, have played defining 
roles in American history.  The different ways that regulators confronted 
these products’ addictive qualities clarifies the role that addiction plays in 
public policy. 
Much has been written about the central role of alcohol in early 
American life.103 America was “awash in drink almost from the start.”104  By 
1830, the average American consumed seven gallons of pure alcohol a 
year—essentially three times the modern rate.105  At the same time, it is a 
subject of open debate whether early Americans conceptualized 
overdrinking as related to compulsion, or even as a matter of concern.106 
Yet, even without the paradigm and vocabulary of compulsion and 
addiction, colonial and post-Revolutionary American political and religious 
leaders recognized the effects of alcohol abuse and sought to counteract it.  
Dr. Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, was 
obsessed with the subject, and was the first prominent American to propose 
that habitual drunkenness was a disease called “addiction.”107  John Adams 
proposed limiting the number of taverns, and Benjamin Franklin—no 
teetotaler himself—labelled taverns “a Pest to Society.”108  Puritans warned 
of the dangers of habitual drunkenness, including neglect of responsibilities 
and inclination to crime.109  Governments enforced regulations “on the 
amount of time one could spend in a tavern,” and “how much one could drink 
there” with harsh penalties, “including public whippings and the stocks.”110  
And, as in antiquity, regulations targeted supply, not just demand; those who 
sold liquor to known drunkards were subject to license revocation.111 
 
 103.  See, e.g., SUSAN CHEEVER, DRINKING IN AMERICA: OUR SECRET HISTORY (2015). 
 104.  DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 7 (2010). 
 105.  Id. at 8. 
 106.  See Harry G. Levine, The Discovery of Addiction: Changing Conceptions of Habitual 
Drunkenness in America: Part I, 15 J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL 493 (1979) (“In colonial thought, 
alcohol did not permanently disable the will; it was not addicting, and habitual drunkenness was 
not regarded as a disease.  With very few exceptions, colonial Americans did not use a vocabulary 
of compulsion with regard to alcoholic beverages.”). 
 107.  See id. (noting that Dr. Benjamin Rush used the term “addicted” to describe the 
relationship between alcohol and “drunkards”); see also CHEEVER, supra note 103, Ch. 1 (noting 
that Dr. Rush classified alcoholism as a disease in 1805). 
 108.  Levine, supra note 106. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
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While Americans’ liquor consumption was astronomical in 1830, less 
than a century later, the country would completely ban the “manufacture, 
sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors” under Prohibition.112  The 
country’s relatively rapid transition into enforced sobriety was motivated by 
concerns explicitly centered around a growing understanding of alcohol 
addiction, inspired by Dr. Rush. 
Rush’s theories about alcohol addiction were central to the founding of 
the temperance movement.113  Central to those theories were concerns about 
addiction’s secondary effects, “particularly disease, poverty, crime, insanity, 
and broken homes.”114  As Lewis Cass, Secretary of War to President 
Andrew Jackson, told a temperance meeting, “The pathology of the disease 
is sufficiently obvious. The difficulty consists in the entire mastery it attains, 
and in that morbid craving for the habitual excitement, which is said to be 
one of the most overpowering feelings that human nature is destined to 
encounter.”115  In all, “the idea that habitual drunkards are alcohol addicts 
. . . was . . . at the heart of the temperance ideology.”116 
The regulatory battles over tobacco would be fought much later.  This, 
in part, reflected uncertainty about tobacco’s addictiveness.  Indeed, in his 
treatise on the “Habitual use of Tobacco,” Dr. Rush evinced a primary 
concern that tobacco use tended to promote drunkenness, rather than that it 
was self-evidently injurious.117  And early American regulations were aimed 
primarily at protecting others from second-hand smoke, as well as at 
avoiding the risk of fire.118 
The science of nicotine addiction remained in dispute until at least the 
1990s.  In 1994, a panel of tobacco CEOs swore to Congress that they did 
not believe nicotine was addictive.119  They were, of course, lying; tobacco 
companies have known that nicotine is addictive since at least the 1960s.120  
As a senior legal executive with Brown & Williamson concluded in 1963, 
 
 112.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
 113.  See Levine, supra note 106. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  BENJAMIN RUSH, Observations Upon the Influence of the Habitual Use of Tobacco Upon 
Health, Morals, and Property, in ESSAYS, LITERARY, MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (1806).  Of 
course, Rush—again ahead of his time—thought that “the progress of habit in the use of Tobacco 
is exactly the same as in the use of spiritous liquors.”  Id.  But most who read Rush identify his 
foremost concern as the alleged link to drunkenness.  See, e.g., JAMES C. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL 
PSYCHOLOGY & MODERN LIFE (5th ed. 1976) (listing “it led to a desire for strong drink” as first 
among Rush’s arguments against tobacco). 
 118.  JEROME E. BROOKS, THE MIGHTY LEAF: TOBACCO THROUGH THE CENTURIES (1952). 
 119.  Jack E. Henningfield, Christine A. Rose & Mitch Zeller, Tobacco Industry Litigation 
Position on Addiction: Continued Dependence on Past views, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL at *iv27 
(2006). 
 120.  Id. at *iv27. 
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cigarette companies do not sell tobacco, but instead are “in the business of 
selling nicotine, an addictive drug.”121 
The obfuscation mattered, because the addition of addiction to the list 
of consequences of tobacco use was a game-changer.  As a tobacco industry 
document noted, “the entire matter of addiction is the most potent weapon a 
prosecuting attorney can have in a lung cancer/cigarette case.”122  And the 
implications also mattered from a regulatory perspective.  Hiding the reality 
of nicotine addiction was important for tobacco executives so as to avoid 
scrutiny from the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).123  
Through at least 2005, tobacco industry attorneys continued to challenge the 
United States Surgeon General’s conclusion that nicotine is addictive.124 
Following the full public understanding of the reality of nicotine 
addiction, anti-smoking regulations drastically changed.  In 2009, Congress 
gave the FDA authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and 
marketing of tobacco products with the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act (“Tobacco Control Act”).125  Amongst Congress’s 
findings, simply: “Nicotine is an addictive drug.”126 
Congress’s theory was that because nicotine is addictive, educational 
campaigns are inadequate to prevent smoking; the vast majority of new and 
repeat smokers understand the consequences of their actions.127  Therefore, 
Congress concluded, “comprehensive restrictions on the sale, promotion, 
and distribution of such products are needed.”128 
b. Fighting the “Vortex of Vice” by Regulating Gambling 
“At various points in history, gambling has been despised and 
criminalized, tolerated, and embraced—often at the same time . . . .  [W]hat 
cannot be defeated is often assimilated.  This is the case with gambling in 
America.”129  In fact, in a very real sense, America was built on gambling.130  
 
 121.  John Slade et al., Nicotine and Addiction: The Brown and Williamson Documents, 274 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 225 (1995). 
 122.  Henningfield, Rose & Zeller, supra note 119, at *iv28 (emphasis added). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2009)). 
 126.  Id. § 2(3), 123 Stat. at 1777. 
 127.  See Comment, Deducting the Cost of Smoking Cessation Programs Under Internal 
Revenue Code Section 213, 81 MICH. L. REV. 237, 240, n.24 (1982) (discussing findings that 90% 
of adolescent smokers and virtually all adult smokers are aware of the dangers of smoking).  
 128.  Tobacco Control Act, § 2(6).  
 129.  EDWARD A. MORSE & ERNEST P. GOSS, GOVERNING FORTUNE 1 (2007). 
 130.  Of course, games of chance existed in America well before any Europeans arrived.  In 
some indigenous communities, such games—involving the wagering of symbolic beans or 
kernels—form an important part of traditional ritual practices.  PAUL PASQUARETTA, GAMBLING 
AND SURVIVAL IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA 121 (2003).  Pasquaretta suggests that indigenous 
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After traditional funding fell through, the Virginia Company was able to set 
sail to America thanks to financing through a lottery.131  Once colonists 
settled in America, lotteries quickly emerged as a prime source of funding 
for the “construction of churches, roads and bridges, and capital products of 
colleges and universities, Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard, and the University 
of North Carolina among them.”132  Indeed, “[u]ntil the early nineteenth 
century, when banking became an established institution, a lottery was the 
normal way to raise funds for all sorts of local, state, and federal products.”133  
As Thomas Jefferson opined, lotteries “layed taxation only on the 
willing.”134 
At the same time, however, private gambling was typically 
circumscribed.  In its very first year, the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
“outlawed dice, cards, and other games thought to induce the colonists 
toward idle or unprofitable use of time.”135  Later colonial governments—
occasionally at the behest of the British136—would also enact prohibitions on 
gambling.137 
Importantly, these early laws tended to target gambling not out of sheer 
moral opprobrium, but rather because of its secondary effects.  The 
Massachusetts Bay Colony prohibition went part-and-parcel with statutes 
prohibiting idleness,138 and generally reflected necessity.  “Those who failed 
to engage in productive activities drained the resources of the larger group, 
which had little margin to maintain a safety net” for those who gambled 
instead of working.139  Britain itself banned lotteries in 1826 because such 
games tended to “corrupt the morals, and encourage a spirit of Speculation 
and Gambling among the lower class of people.”140  New York’s first anti-
gambling statute, enacted in 1741, reflected similar concerns, as did those in 
other colonies and, later, states.141 
 
Americans were so devastated by the introduction of European-style gambling in part because 
Native religious teachers initially encouraged their compatriots to partake.  Id. at 119-20. 
 131.  Raymond D. Sauer, The Political Economy of Gambling Regulation, 22 MANAGERIAL & 
DECISION ECON. 5, 6 (2001). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  PASQUARETTA, supra note 130, at 116. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  MORSE & GOSS, supra note 129, at 3. 
 136.  PASQUARETTA, supra note 130, at 117. 
 137.  Sauer, supra note 131. 
 138.  MORSE & GOSS, supra note 129, at 3. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  PASQUARETTA, supra note 130, at 117. 
 141.  See MORSE & GOSS, supra note 129, at 3 (“[The New York statute] was enacted in 
response to the negative consequences of frequent public gambling. Similar laws arose in other 
states, which focused not only on disorderly conduct associated with gambling houses but also on 
the negative effects on family welfare from gambling losses and the perceived corruption of 
youth.”).  
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As America expanded westward, so did gambling.  And so did anti-
gambling legislation. In Tennessee, convicted gamblers lost the right to hold 
public office for five years.142  An impassioned opinion by Justice John 
Catron of the Tennessee Supreme Court, who would go on to serve on the 
United States Supreme Court, explained that gambling was regulable, 
essentially because it was addictive: 
 
There is implanted in the nature of man an inclination to gamble, 
which of all others is most difficult to bring within the restraints of 
law. . . . 
[I]t lies dormant until once aroused, and then, with the contagion 
and fury of pestilence, it sweeps morals, motives to honest pursuits, 
and industry into the vortex of vice; unhinges the principles of 
religion and common honesty; the mind becomes ungovernable, and 
is destroyed to all useful purposes . . . . 
Where is the professional man or mechanic who will toil at his 
vocation and acquire by shillings when his mind is diseased by 
similar hopes? We know he abandons his calling and relies upon 
gambling chance for his own and his family’s support . . . . 
. . . [G]aming, as a general evil, leads to vicious inclinations, 
destruction of morals, abandonment of industry and honest 
employment, a loss of self-control and respect. . . . The American 
and European journals are full of cases of the most distressing 
nature; of bankers, merchants, clerks to banking institutions, men in 
almost every description of trust, public and private, becoming 
bankrupts and thieves, to the ruin of themselves and others. Look 
for the source of their misfortune; you find it in lotteries, loo, faro, 
thimble, dice and the like.143 
 
Although early regulators may not have articulated the exact words for 
it, nor did they possess a modern understanding of the brain’s reward 
circuitry, they nonetheless targeted gambling in order to prevent gambling 
addiction. 
 
* * * 
As the above indicates, the regulation of addiction is a time-honored 
tradition, both in the United States and abroad.  The American experience, 
in particular, demonstrates the comprehension that a substance or behavior 
being addictive marks an inflection point in society’s relationship with that 
substance or behavior.  The motivating factor in transforming the drunkest 
 
 142.  MORSE & GOSS, supra note 129, at 5-6. 
 143.  State v. Smith, 10 Tenn. 272, 273 (1829). 
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country on earth in the 1830s into a legally dry country in less than a century 
was the popular groundswell of belief in alcoholism.  Gambling restrictions 
have, since their inception, been premised on the idea that gambling appeals 
to an irrepressible instinct.  And it was only after tobacco companies (mostly) 
gave up on denying the reality of nicotine addiction that Congress granted 
the FDA authority to place significant restrictions on the sale of tobacco 
products. 
These regulatory traditions reflect a rare empathetic response in a 
relatively libertarian society.  Americans have never shied away from 
blaming the destitute or deviant for their circumstances.  Addiction, 
however, represents a degradation of the fundamental assumption of free will 
upon which a liberal society is founded.  Addicts are the exception: a 
subclass of the errant that Americans do not entirely blame for their ill-
fortune. 
This also indicates one final pattern that can be drawn from the global 
and American experience with addiction regulation.  Regulators will place 
the blame for addiction at the feet of those who cause it.  From the Roman 
law allowing a man to recover against anyone who induced his son or his 
slave to gamble, to the Eighteenth Amendment’s prohibition of the 
manufacture, sale, and transportation—but not the consumption—of alcohol, 
those who inflict addiction have been required to bear a significant 
proportion of the costs of the disease. 
C. Expressive Products and Addiction 
The brain’s reward circuitry—the production of dopamine in response 
to external stimuli—is responsible for behavioral addictions, which lack an 
external chemical “hook” like nicotine.  However, the reward circuitry also 
explains why humans enjoy anything; a product that failed to generate 
dopamine would be an abysmal failure.  So, a pivotal definitional challenge 
crops up: distinguishing addictive expression from enjoyable expression.  
For instance, while an earwormy pop song might become stuck in one’s 
head, and indeed may have been written with the intent to remain so,144 there 
is little indication that there are any long-term consequences to that stickiness 
that may correlate with problematic usage and justify regulation. 
The essential regulatory issue is whether the addictive elements of 
expressive products can be separated from the underlying speech.  
Gambling, for instance, is not perceived as involving protected expression, 
and therefore, there is no First Amendment defense to avoiding a gambling 
regulation.  This is not necessarily true of video games and pornography.  
 
 144.  Sarah Kaplan, Why You Can’t Get That One Song Out of Your Head: The Science of 
Earworms, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-scien 
ce/wp/2016/11/04/why-you-cant-get-that-one-song-out-of-your-head-the-science-of-earworms/. 
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Focusing on these two expressive products demonstrates how regulators 
might seek to address addiction, and why one must reckon with the First 
Amendment in order to do so. 
1. Video Games 
a. The Scientific Evidence 
There is strong early evidence that gaming can be addictive.  While the 
DSM-V has taken only intermediate steps to recognize gaming addiction, the 
World Health Organization (“WHO”) has moved more aggressively than the 
DSM-V by including “gaming disorder” in its diagnostic manual, the 
International Classification of Diseases.145  The WHO’s recognition rests on 
a solid body of research. 
First, studies have suggested that “[g]ame cue-associated brain 
activation in Internet gaming addicts occurs in the same brain regions . . . as 
with drug cue-associated brain activation in drug addicts.”146  In other words, 
gaming addiction is an observable neurophysiological phenomenon.  Studies 
commonly involve magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”) or 
electroencephalographic (“EEG”) imaging of the brains of control groups 
and groups of excessive gamers.  One such study showed both groups still 
images of a video game.  The gamers showed increased neural activity in the 
same parts of the brain as those implicated in substance abusers.147 Another 
study demonstrated the involvement of dopamine in video game addiction 
by successfully treating excessive players with a dopamine reuptake 
inhibiter; after six weeks on the inhibiter, “craving for online gaming, total 
game play time, and cue-induced brain activity in prefrontal cortex were 
decreased.”148 
Gaming, like gambling, “involve[s] a number of abstractions, such as 
game rules, codes, tokens, rewards in virtual worlds, etc.,” and “[t]he human 
mind appears sufficiently powerful to translate these abstractions into an 
affectively charged ‘reward’ experience.”149  And gamers, like substance 
addicts, develop tolerance, which leads to more time, effort, and money spent 
on chasing the dopamine rush of a gaming reward.150 
 
 145.  Jordan Erica Webber, ‘Dangerous Gaming’: Is the WHO Right to Class Excessive Video 
Game Play as a Health Disorder?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
games/2018/feb/05/video-gaming-health-disorder-world-health-organisation-addiction. 
 146.  Grant et al., supra note 56. 
 147.  Matilda Hellman et al., Is There Such a Thing as Online Video Game Addiction? A Cross-
Disciplinary Review, 21 ADDICTION RESEARCH & THEORY 102, 105-06 (2013). 
 148.  Id. at 106. 
 149.  Id. at 108-09. 
 150.  Id. 
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The anecdotal evidence for gaming addiction is also significant, and 
frequently alarming.  There is the mother who strangled her two-year-old 
child when he interrupted her gaming to ask for a meal, or the thirteen-year-
old boy who beat his mother to death when she accused him of spending too 
much time gaming.151  Several people have died in marathon game 
sessions.152  One of the most tragic and darkly ironic examples is the Korean 
couple who neglected their three-month-old child in order to raise a virtual 
child in an online video game until their real child starved to death.153  The 
problem of gaming addiction in South Korea is so severe that the Korean 
government funds treatment clinics.154 
Deaths remain rare.  Less rare are the host of other harms inflicted by 
video game addiction, which “generates its own special destructive class of 
neurological and social burdens.”155  Gaming addiction, like other 
recognized addictions, is “associated with dysfunction in five domains: 
academic, social, occupational, developmental and behavioral.”156  Gaming 
addicts report lower grades and work performance, disruption of their daily 
routines, and impacts on hygiene and healthy eating and sleeping routines.157 
Then, there is the money.  Games—especially mobile games, the largest 
segment of the gaming economy158—have increasingly begun to rely on 
“microtransactions” for revenue.159  Microtransactions are “a tiny purchase” 
 
 151.  Daphne Bavelier et al., Brains on Video Games, 12 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 763, 
764 (2011) (A twenty-two-year-old man also beat and killed his mother for complaining about his 
gaming.); Mark Tran, Girl Starved to Death While Parents Raised Virtual Child in Online Game, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/05/korean-girl-starved-
online-game. 
 152.  See e.g., Tran, supra note 151; see also Ben Guarino, Prominent Gamer Died During 
Live-Streamed Attempt to Play ‘World of Tanks’ for 24 Hours, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/23/va-man-died-during-marath 
on-attempt-to-play-video-game-for-24-hours/ (listing several examples of deaths during marathon 
gaming sessions, including a man who died after 19 straight hours of World of Warcraft, a teenager 
who died after 40 hours of Diablo 3, and a man who died after 50 hours of Starcraft). 
 153.  Tran, supra note 151. 
 154.  Nelson Groom, Online Gaming is South Korea’s Most Popular Drug, VICE (Jan. 6, 2014), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/4w7wdm/online-gaming-is-south-koreas-most-popular-drug. 
 155.  Bavelier et al., supra note 151, at 765. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Tom Wijman, Mobile Revenues Account for More Than 50% of the Global Games Market 
as It Reaches $137.9 Billion in 2018, NEWZOO (Apr. 30, 2018), https://newzoo.com/insights/ 
articles/the-global-games-market-will-generate-152-1-billion-in-2019-as-the-u-s-overtakes-china-
as-the-biggest-market/; Tom Wijman, The Global Games Market Will Generate $152.1 Billion in 
2019 as the U.S. Overtakes China as the Biggest Market, NEWZOO (June 18, 2019), https:// 
newzoo.com/insights/articles/the-global-games-market-will-generate-152-1-billion-in-2019-as-th 
e-u-s-overtakes-china-as-the-biggest-market/. 
 159.  Kevin Anderton, The Ongoing Controversy of Microtransactions in Gaming, FORBES 
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinanderton/2018/03/07/the-on-going-controversy 
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of an item inside of a game.160  A player might spend a dollar to speed up a 
game’s enforced wait time for some construction to finish, or a few dollars 
on a specific cosmetic item, such as a specific coloration for a character’s 
armor.161  Microtransactions are ubiquitous in free-to-play games,162 but are 
also rapidly becoming the norm in retail-priced AAA games.163 
Few players spend money on microtransactions, but developers are fine 
with that; they are hunting “whales.”  “Whales” is the industry-generated 
term (borrowed, tellingly, from casinos) for the “biggest spenders” that drive 
most of the revenue for a game with microtransactions.164  One industry 
report found that half of free-to-play game revenue came from 0.15% of 
players, with only 1.5% spending any money at all.165  The horror stories pile 
up: the teenager who worked two jobs in order to spend $13,500 on in-game 
purchases over the course of three years;166 a former developer who reported 
seeing people spending $15,000 on microtransactions in a popular AAA 
game, Mass Effect 3;167 the Japanese company that hired an employee 
exclusively to cater to a single person who spent $10,000 a month on their 
game.168 The concern, of course, is that developers are preying on addicts. 
 
-of-microtransactions-in-gaming-infographic/#4302f62e1d9c (“The future of gaming seems to be 
in microtransactions.”). 
 160.  Brian Crecente, What are DLC, Loot Boxes and Microtransactions? An Explainer, 
VARIETY (2017), https://variety.com/2017/gaming/features/what-is-a-loot-box-1203047991/. 
 161.  Most perniciously, as discussed infra, a player might spend a small sum for a chance to 
receive a certain cosmetic item in a “loot box.” 
 162.  See Crecente, supra note 160 (noting that an analyst group estimated that “in-game 
microtransactions made up 92% of all Apple Store revenue and 98% of all Google Play revenue in 
2013”). 
 163.  See id. (“As smartphone game developers raked in the money, larger, more traditional 
game publishers started to take note and experiment with some of these systems on computer and 
console games.”); id. (“These days, it’s more unusual to see a big budget game without some form 
of microtransaction . . . than it is to see one with the post-release money maker.”). “AAA” is an 
informal label denoting that a game was published by a major developer and generally implies that 
the game has a “considerable development and marketing budget,” as opposed to “independent” or 
“indie” games. Samuel Stewart, What Is A Triple-A Game (AAA)?, GAMINGSCAN (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.gamingscan.com/what-is-a-triple-a-game/. 
 164.  Stephanie Carmichael, What It Means to be a ‘Whale’—and Why Social Gamers are Just 
Gamers, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 14, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2013/03/14/whales-
and-why-social-gamers-are-just-gamers/. 
 165.  Eric Johnson, A Long Tail of Whales: Half of Mobile Games Money Comes From 0.15 
Percent of Players, VOX (Feb. 26, 2014, 2:37 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/2/26/11623998/a-
long-tail-of-whales-half-of-mobile-games-money-comes-from-0-15. 
 166.  Ethan Gach, Meet the 19-Year-Old Who Spent Over $10,000 on Microtransactions, 
KOTAKU (Nov. 29, 2017, 5:12 PM), https://kotaku.com/meet-the-19-year-old-who-spent-over-10-
000-on-microtra-1820854953. 
 167.  Robert Purchese, “I’ve Seen People Literally Spend $15,000 on Mass Effect Multiplayer 
Cards”, EUROGAMER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2017-10-23-manveer-
heir-bioware-mass-effect-ea-monetisation. 
 168.  Johnson, supra note 165. 
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All of this has resulted in “an emerging scientific consensus that video-
game play has the potential to become pathologically addictive.”169  Of 
course, the scope of the problem remains difficult to ascertain; in one study, 
“researchers diagnosed gaming disorder using 18 different methods, 
producing prevalence rates between 0% and 45%.”170 
b. What makes games addictive? 
 
While behavioral addictions, like substance-based addictions do have 
an important genetic component,171 the design of a game is also a causal 
factor.172  Several features of video games—some optional, some probably 
not—tend to promote addiction. 
First, games can mimic gambling.  In particular, those games that 
“reward frequently and at irregular intervals” mimic “short odds gambling 
with a high event frequency”—a sort of gambling that is believed to be 
particularly addictive.173  To effectively mimic gambling, games do not need 
to literally require that the players bet anything; the salient feature is the 
introduction of an element of chance into the receipt of a reward for 
completing an in-game task.  For instance, defeating a particular boss in an 
MMORPG might offer players a 7.5% chance of receiving a certain, unique 
item.174 
Even more pernicious, of course, is actual gambling, in which players 
pay real-world money (or virtual currency that can be easily purchased with 
real-world money), and receive in return a “loot box” containing random 
rewards.  Loot boxes are “virtual packages . . . often adorned with enticing 
sounds and lights” that contain, obviously, loot—weapons, armor, or 
cosmetic items for your in-game character or profile.175  Loot boxes have 
reached “epidemic” status in games.176 
 
 169.  Bavelier et al., supra note 151, at 765. 
 170.  Cecilia D’Anastasio, The Truth About ‘Video Game Addiction’, KOTAKU (July 6, 2018, 
11:08 AM), https://kotaku.com/the-truth-about-video-game-addiction-1827374773. 
 171.  Grant et al., supra note 56, at 6. 
 172.  Hellman et al., supra note 147 at 105.  See also Bavelier et al., supra note 151, at 765 
(“[S]ome game seem to have much more of an addictive potential than others.”). 
 173.  Hellman et al., supra note 147, at 105. 
 174.  Videos compiling live reactions to rare item drops are commonplace.  See, e.g., Mitzz, 
Destiny: TOP 5 GJALLARHORN Reactions (Insane Reactions), YOUTUBE (Apr. 3, 2015), https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=yorxOLgk4Rc.  Behavioral psychologists would undoubtedly have a 
field day with such reactions as: “Oh!  He found a Gjallarhorn!  He found a Gjallarhorn!  Wow!  
Wow!  I hate this game!  This game is so annoying.  I’m fucking done.”  See id. 
 175.  Drew Cartee, The Loot Box Epidemic in Modern Video Games, MEDIUM (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@dc99/the-loot-box-epidemic-in-modern-video-games-308ed8f73f38. 
 176.  Id. 
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Random loot drops and loot boxes are so addictive because the brain’s 
dopamine system is “very interested in unpredictable rewards.  Dopamine 
cells are most active when there is maximum uncertainty, and the dopamine 
system responds more to an uncertain reward than the same reward delivered 
on a predictable basis.”177  This psychological principle has been understood 
since the 1930s, when B.F. Skinner demonstrated that animals rewarded with 
food every time they pressed a button quickly grew bored, while those 
previously given random food rewards would sometimes make hundreds of 
attempts after Skinner stopped rewarding them.178 
Because of the psychological effects of “variable rate reinforcement,” 
loot boxes are inherently, potently addictive.179  But developers do not stop 
there.  Without fail, the boxes are a visual and auditory spectacle to open.  
As one developer revealed: “When you start opening a loot box, we want to 
build anticipation . . . .  We do this in a lot of ways—animations, camera 
work, spinning plates, and sounds.  We even build a little anticipation with 
the glow that emits from a loot box’s cracks before you open it.”180  Some 
games have potentially available loot scroll by in an explicit visual reference 
to a slot machine, showing the player how close they were—even though the 
outcome is not a matter of “close” from a programming perspective—to 
getting a different, no doubt rarer or more valuable, piece of loot.181  The 
design mimics “near-misses,” which have been shown to encourage 
prolonged gambling even in those who do not gamble regularly, let alone in 
problem gamblers.182 
Developers can then stack additional mechanics, some of which are 
intended to be utterly unknown to players, on top of their random loot 
systems to encourage further consumption.  For instance, Activision has 
patented a matchmaking system meant to artificially inflate players’ success 
rates after making a microtransaction.183  The patent reads: “For example, if 
the player purchased a particular weapon, the microtransaction engine may 
match the player in a gameplay session in which the particular weapon is 
 
 177.  Alex Wiltshire, Behind the Addictive Psychology and Seductive Art of Loot Boxes, PC 
GAMER (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.pcgamer.com/behind-the-addictive-psychology-and-seduct 
ive-art-of-loot-boxes/. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Cecelia D’Anastasio, Why Opening Loot Boxes Feels Like Christmas, According to Game 
Devs, KOTAKU (Mar. 20, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://kotaku.com/why-opening-loot-boxes-feels-like-
christmas-according-1793446800. 
 181.  Wiltshire, supra note 177.  
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Heather Alexandra, Activision Patents Matchmaking that Encourages Players to Buy 
Microtransactions, KOTAKU (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://kotaku.com/activision-patents-
matchmaking-that-encourages-players-1819630937. 
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highly effective.”184  The system would also match players it thought were 
chasing a particular item with players that already had and used that item, to 
increase the drive to make the microtransaction.185  Activision has denied 
that the patented system is in use in any game,186 although it would be 
impossible for players to know. 
Second, games rely on social instincts—both competitive and 
cooperative—to hook users.  Social gameplay can be potently addictive.  
One study found nearly half of all MMORPG players (45%) played more 
than 40 hours a week; while half (49%) of all non-MMORPG players played 
2 or fewer hours per week.187  The authors concluded that the “social aspects” 
of MMORPGs make their players so prone to overuse.188  Another study of 
several thousand MMORPG players sought to explain whether certain 
players were more at risk of developing an addiction.  It found that “[p]layers 
who were attracted to the highly social and competitive aspects of the gaming 
environment were most likely to be in the high risk of addiction class.”189 
Anecdotal evidence from gamers confirms the compelling nature of 
some social features.  Games may introduce “clans” or “guilds,” which are 
collectively benefitted when the player plays, creating a sense of social 
obligation.190  Games can include activities that require several players to 
complete, requiring players to form social bonds with others to complete the 
activity.191  Developers may also, as contemplated in the Activision patent, 
rely on a player’s competitive drive to acquire loot that they see on another 
player’s character.192  Amongst players of free-to-play mobile games with 
microtransactions, use of microtransactions appears to be significantly 
driven by developers’ conscious choice to essentially require the purchases 
in order to remain competitive with others.193 
 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Alexandra, supra note 185. 
 187.  Brian D. Ng & Peter Wiemer-Hastings, Addiction to the Internet and Online Gaming, 8 
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAVIOR 110, 112 (2005). 
 188.  But see id. at 113 (concluding that heavy users of MMORPGs in the study’s dataset could 
not be categorized as addicts). 
 189.  Zaheer Hussain, Glenn A. Williams, & Mark D. Griffiths, An Exploratory Study of the 
Association Between Online Gaming Addiction and Enjoyment Motivations for Playing Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-playing games, 50 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 221, 228 (2015). 
 190.  See Mark Smith, The real-life story of a computer game addict who played for up to 16 
hours a day, WALES ONLINE (July 30, 2018, 7:35 PM), https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/hea 
lth/real-life-story-computer-game-14968843 (“You had clans of people, and that’s where you’d 
really have a ‘family’.”); Jack Flanagan, The psychology of video game addiction, THE WEEK (Feb. 
6, 2014), https://theweek.com/articles/451660/psychology-video-game-addiction. 
 191.  See Mike Rougeau, How Destiny Players Fixed One Of The Game’s Biggest Problems, 
KOTAKU (Jan. 10, 2015, 4:30 PM), https://kotaku.com/how-destiny-players-fixed-one-of-the-game 
s-biggest-pro-1678732125; Flanagan, supra note 190. 
 192.  See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 193.  See Gach, supra note 166. 
1 - MORGAN FINAL 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:20 PM 
Winter 2020] ADDICTION AND EXPRESSION 221 
A final addictive pathway suggested by the literature is the increasing 
visual sophistication of video games.194  Video games are capable of 
inducing addiction through the “supernormal stimuli” effect.  The effect 
describes “a phenomenon wherein artificial stimuli can be created that will 
override an evolutionarily developed genetic response.”195  Because visually 
spectacular games (like pornography and certain processed foods) are so 
highly stimulating, “[i]t recruits our natural reward system, but potentially 
activates it at higher levels than the levels of activation our ancestors 
typically encountered as our brains evolved, making it liable to switch into 
an addictive mode.”196  The concept of supernormal stimuli has been 
demonstrated in animal tests: mother birds will abandon their own eggs to 
sit on larger, more colorful artificial eggs, and male butterflies will abandon 
actual female butterflies and attempt to mate with artificial females with 
larger, more colorful wings. 
2. Pornography 
a. The scientific evidence 
Long considered immoral or a social ill,197 pornography consumption 
has only recently been recognized by the scientific and medical communities 
as resulting in something like addiction.  But, given the relatively recent 
advent of internet pornography, it is unsurprising that the authors of both the 
DSM-V198 and the WHO’s ICD-11199 concluded that inclusion of 
pornography addiction in the diagnostic manuals was premature. 
Nonetheless, numerous studies have concluded “that Internet 
pornography addiction fits into the addiction framework and shares similar 
basic mechanisms with substance addiction.”200  Indeed, one review of the 
available studies concluded that the American Psychiatric Association’s 
decision not to include Internet pornography addiction in the same category 
as Internet gaming addiction in the DSM-V was “inconsistent with existing 
and emerging scientific evidence.”201 
 
 194.  See, e.g., Mark Aguiar et al., Leisure Luxuries and the Labor Supply of Young Men, (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23552, 2017). 
 195.  Todd Love et al., Neuroscience of Internet Pornography Addiction: A Review and 
Update, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 388, 390–91 (2015). 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See, e.g., Obscene Publications Act 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c.83. 
 198.  Rubén de Alarcón et al., Online Porn Addiction: What We Know and What We Don’t—
A Systemic Review, 8 J. CLINICAL MEDICINE 91 (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti 
cles/PMC6352245/. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Love et al., supra note 195, at 389. 
 201.  Id. at 390. 
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In particular, “there is a glut of evidence” that “natural rewards” 
achieved through interaction with Internet pornography are capable of 
producing the same neurobiological effects as addictive drugs.202  This is 
because the neurological networks “involved in human sexual behavior are 
remarkably similar to the networks involved in processing other rewards.”203 
To demonstrate the similarity of pornography to recognized substance-
based addictions, one study showed both sexually explicit (pornographic) 
videos and erotic (non-pornographic) videos to a control group, and to a 
group of subjects exhibiting compulsive sexual behavior.204  The viewers 
were then asked two questions: how much did they like the videos, and how 
much did the videos increase their sexual desire.205  Relative to the control 
group, the test group liked the erotic videos more, but desired the 
pornographic videos more, “indicat[ing] a dissociation between liking and 
wanting . . . replicat[ing] the results of well-established studies . . . wherein 
addicts report higher levels of wanting but not of liking their salient 
rewards.”206 
A final marker indicating that pornography can be addictive is that 
heavy porn users exhibit tolerance, a hallmark of addiction.  Anecdotal data 
has clearly established that “over time, a damaged dopamine system makes 
one ‘tolerant’” which “drives a search for ramped-up stimulation, and this 
can drive the change in sexual tastes towards the extreme.”207  For instance, 
a member survey of a subreddit dedicated to overcoming pornography 
addiction indicated that, amongst 1509 responses, 56 percent reported that 
their taste in porn “became increasingly ‘extreme’ or ‘deviant.’”208  Another 
study found that 49 percent of men reported “at least sometimes searching 
for sexual content . . . that [was] not previously interesting to them or that 
 
 202.  Christopher M. Olsen, Natural Rewards, Neuroplasticity, and Non-Drug Addictions, 61 
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 1109, at 14 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC31 
39704/. 
 203.  J.R. Georgiadis, M. L. Kringelbach, The Human Sexual Response Cycle: Brain Imaging 
Evidence Linking Sex to Other Pleasures, 98 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 49, 74 (2012), 
http://www.kringelbach.org/papers/PN_Georgiadis2012.pdf. 
 204.  Valerie Voon et al., Neural Correlates of Sexual Cue Reactivity in Individuals With and 
Without Compulsive Sexual Behaviors, 9 PLOS ONE 1 (July 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pmc/articles/PMC4094516/. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Love et al., supra note 195, at 408 (describing the Voon study). 
 207.  Norman Doidge, Brain Scans of Porn Addicts: What’s Wrong With This Picture?, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 26, 2013, 1:29 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/26/ 
brain-scans-porn-addicts-sexual-tastes. 
 208.  The First Semi-Irregular /r/NoFap Sex Survey (April 2012), GOOGLE DOCS, https://docs. 
google.com/file/d/0B7q3tr4EV02weTFmV0oySnpJZjA/ (last visited May 26, 2019). 
1 - MORGAN FINAL 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:20 PM 
Winter 2020] ADDICTION AND EXPRESSION 223 
they considered disgusting.”209  More colorfully, in 2018, Pornhub’s top 20 
search terms included two popular video games, several categories of 
animated or cartoon pornography, and both “step mom” and “mom.”210  The 
issue has even become meta; there is a subgenre of pornography about 
pornography addiction.211 
Much like substance addictions and gaming addiction, pornography 
addiction can have serious consequences. Subjects with compulsive sexual 
behavior (“CSB”) reported that, 
 
As a result of excessive use of sexually explicit materials, they 
had lost jobs due to use at work . . . damaged intimate 
relationships or negatively influenced other social activities . . . 
experienced diminished libido or erectile function specifically 
in physical relationships with women (although not in 
relationship to the sexually explicit material) . . . used escorts 
excessively . . . experienced suicidal ideation . . . and us[ed] 
large amounts of money. . . . CSB subjects compared to healthy 
volunteers had significantly more difficulty with sexual arousal 
and experienced more erectile difficulties in intimate sexual 
relationships . . . . 
 
Importantly, CSB subjects reported using the Internet for viewing 
online sexually explicit material for 25.49% of total online use . . . compared 
to 4.49% in healthy volunteers.212 
The same study reported that CSB subjects viewed online pornography 
for 13.21 hours per week,213 which is the annual equivalent of spending the 
entire month February watching porn. 
As with video game addiction, the prevalence of pornography addiction 
is not yet known.  Only one study with a representative sample has been 
conducted; in it, 1.2% of adult Australian women and 4.4% of adult 
 
 209.  Aline Wéry & J. Billieux, Online Sexual Activities: An Exploratory Study of Problematic 
and Non-Problematic Usage Patterns in a Sample of Men, 56 COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAV. 257, 
260 (2016). 
 210.  2018 Year in Review, PORNHUB (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.pornhub.com/insights/ 
2018-year-in-review. 
 211.  See /u/NoFaTC, We Need to Take a Look at Sissy Porn, REDDIT (Dec. 27, 2017), https:// 
www.reddit.com/r/NoFap/comments/7mh1wc/we_need_to_take_a_look_at_sissy_porn/ (“[T]hat 
shit is the most addicting porn i’ve ever seen. everyone in this comments section says it’s just like 
any other porn, just as bad. this shit is way worse. it makes you addicted really fast, teases you 
about the fact that you’re addicted . . . .”). 
 212.  Voon, supra note 204.  See also Sandra Song, Kanye West Opens Up About His Porn 
Addiction, PAPER MAG. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.papermag.com/kanye-west-porn-addiction-
2641095612.html (discussing artist Kanye West’s statement that porn addiction “has impacted 
every choice I have made in my life from age five to now”). 
 213.  Voon, supra note 204. 
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Australian men considered themselves addicted to pornography.214  Another 
smaller study among a different population reported similar rates,215 while 
others have found rates as low as 0.7% (among Spanish college students, 
although the study found that 8.6% were at risk of developing pathological 
use)216 or as high as 9.8% (among substance users).217 
b. Why is porn addictive? 
The commonly accepted causal mechanism for pornography addiction 
is the “supernormal stimuli” phenomenon.218  Indeed, in most definitions, the 
functional equivalent of “supernormal stimuli” is the feature that 
distinguishes pornography from erotica.219  Porn is by definition, extreme; it 
features actions and sounds and camera shots and a treatment of women that 
differs greatly from most sexual encounters.220  Unfortunately, outside of 
reference to supernormal stimuli, qualitative analyses that would reveal 
whether certain kinds of pornography or features of pornography are more 
likely to generate problematic usage appear to be nonexistent in scientific 
literature.  Feminist critiques of porn, and anecdotal evidence from users, 
though, are lush with examples.  Naomi Wolf sums them up: 
 
Here is what young women tell me on college campuses when 
the subject comes up: They can’t compete, and they know it.  For 
how can a real woman—with pores and her own breasts and even 
sexual needs of her own (let alone with speech that goes beyond 
“More, more, you big stud!”)—possibly compete with a cybervision 
 
 214.  See de Alarcón et al., supra note 198. 
 215.  See, e.g., Michael W. Ross, Sven-Axel Månsson & Kristian Daneback, Prevalence, 
Severity, and Correlates of Problematic Sexual Internet Use in Swedish Men and Women, 41 
ARCHS. SEX. BEHAV. 459, 459 (2012) (reporting that, among a sample of 1,913 younger Swedish 
men and women, 2% of women and 5% of men indicated serious problems correlating with 
addiction or problematic use of pornography). 
 216.  Rafael Ballester-Arnal et al., Cybersex Addiction: A Study on Spanish College Students, 
43 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 567 (2017). 
 217.  Lisa Najavits et al., A Study of Multiple Behavioral Addictions in a Substance Abuse 
Sample, 49 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 479 (2013). 
 218.  See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text; see also Donald L. Hilton, Jr., 
Pornography Addiction—A Supranormal Stimulus Considered in the Context of Neuroplasticity, 3 
SOCIOAFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE & PSYCH. 1, 5 (2013). 
 219.  Berta Davis, Erotica vs. Pornography, INTERN. ENCYC. OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (Apr. 20, 
2015), https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118896877.wbiehs133 (“Eroticism is seen as an artful 
expression of sexuality; it is considered ‘vanilla,’ nonviolent, and sensual.  Pornography, on the 
other hand, seems to correlate sexuality with some form of aggression and/or imbalance of male-
female power relationships.”). 
 220.  But see Jay Clarkson & Shana Kopaczewski, Pornography Addiction and the 
Medicalization of Free Speech, 37 J. COMM. INQUIRY 128, 137–38 (2013) (suggesting that the 
concept of “pornography addiction” is an effort by moralist crusaders against porn to censor sex 
other than heterosexual intercourse with one’s spouse). 
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of perfection, downloadable and extinguishable at will, who comes, 
so to speak, utterly submissive and tailored to the consumer’s least 
specification? 
For most of human history, erotic images have been reflections 
of, or celebrations of, or substitutes for, real naked women.  For the 
first time in human history, the images’ power and allure have 
supplanted that of real naked women.  Today, real naked women are 
just bad porn.221 
 
The feature of pornography that functions as a key driver for addiction 
is novelty.222  Essentially, viewing porn “has the same effect” on the regions 
of the brain’s reward circuitry as does “viewing actual sexual partners.”223  
“What is different is that the Internet provides access to a vast surplus of 
erotic imagery, and the novelty of this imagery is practically unending,” 
which appeals to the “well documented” preference for novelty in sexual 
partners among humans.224  With respect to novelty, in other words, no 
particular features of the pornography are responsible for producing 
problematic overuse; the addictiveness comes from the fact that there is so 
much of it. 
* * * 
The foregoing information lays bare the primary challenge of 
addressing the problems generated by addiction to expressive products: 
much of what makes them addictive also makes them worth consuming. 
This is the fundamental difficulty in addressing addiction from a 
regulatory perspective, or even from the perspective of a conscientious 
developer.  An overzealous attempt to eliminate what psychologists have 
identified as pathways of addiction in video games would result in the 
prohibition of: gaining experience and leveling up; bright colors, attractive 
sounds and explosions; competitive and cooperative multiplayer 
functionality; missions and quests; powerful characters; and environments to 
explore.  Like an old joke about products in the Soviet Union, gamers would 
be left playing a particularly boring version of Pong.  As a practical matter, 
this is undesirable; as a legal matter, this seems inconsistent with the idea of 
the First Amendment. 
Porn, meanwhile, demonstrates even more vividly the dilemma faced 
by regulators.  It is functionally defined by its addictive properties, and the 
product has survived a decades-long legal and political assault thanks, in 
 
 221.  Naomi Wolf, The Porn Myth, NEW YORK MAG. (Oct. 9, 2003), http://nymag.com/ 
nymetro/news/trends/n_9437/ (emphasis added). 
 222.  Cody Harper & David C. Hodgins, Examining Correlates of Problematic Internet 
Pornography Use Among University Students, 5 J. BEHAVIORAL ADDICTIONS 178, 180 (2016). 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
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large part, to the First Amendment.  The next Part will consider whether 
limited regulatory interventions can be made consistent with the First 
Amendment. 
II. Expression 
There are legitimate reasons to explore greater regulatory intervention 
to address addictive expression.  Game developers openly boast about 
addictiveness, comparing their products to slot machines, and their addicted 
customers to casino “whales,” and show little intent of implementing greater 
self-regulation.  They appear, in other words, to be “exploit[ing] players’ 
cognitive biases and predictably irrational behavior to make more money.”225  
Bad behavior on the developers’ part may justify regulation consistent with 
longstanding legal tradition targeting those who induce addiction. 
Alternatively, the negative effects of addiction on the individual, as 
aggregated into meaningful, large-scale social consequences, may 
independently justify regulation, regardless of speakers’ bad faith or lack 
thereof.  For instance, as pornography addiction becomes increasingly 
recognized, regulators may, for instance, seek to regulate pornography not 
because of moral objections to its content, but in order to prevent addiction 
and its consequences.226 
Regardless of the impetus for regulation, the speakers in this scenario 
are likely to mount a formidable First Amendment defense.  Both video 
games227 and pornography are presumptively protected by the First 
Amendment.228  Of course, this does not mean that all regulations targeting 
video game developers or pornography producers implicate the First 
 
 225.  Zagal, Björk & Lewis, supra note 33, at 6. 
 226.  See Lihi Yona, Politicizing Health, Medicalizing Porn: Rethinking Modern Pornography, 
16 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 113, 125-26 170-71 (2014) (arguing that “medicalizing” the question 
of pornography by making the question one of addiction rather than equality of the sexes provides 
a potential path to regulation); but see Clarkson & Kopaczewski, supra note 220 (concluding that 
this represents a cynical attempt to restrict free speech by those who actually object on moral 
grounds). 
 227.  See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“California correctly 
acknowledges that video games qualify for First Amendment protection . . . .  [V]ideo games 
communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices . . . and 
through features distinctive to the medium . . . .  That suffices to confer First Amendment 
protection.”). 
 228.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–25 (1983) (holding that only “obscene” material 
is unprotected and providing a definition of obscenity that does not include all pornography).  See 
also SCOTT ON INFO. TECH. § 17.11 (2015) (“Obscenity is not synonymous with pornography, as 
most pornography is not legally obscene, i.e., most pornography is protected by the First 
Amendment.”). 
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Amendment.  Governments may (and should229) enforce labor laws against 
developers, and the First Amendment will not stand in the way. 
But many regulations will implicate speech rights.230 Laws directly 
targeting the inclusion of addictive content in games or pornography would 
almost certainly be content-based regulations of protected speech, subject to 
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment.  Similarly, laws requiring 
speakers to warn that the speech at issue contains properties known to 
facilitate compulsive consumption, like warnings on cigarette cartons, are 
instances of compelled speech, which typically must also survive strict 
scrutiny.  Finally, laws regulating the advertising or addictive expression 
would implicate the Amendment’s protection of commercial speech, 
requiring that the laws satisfy the Central Hudson test by being the least-
restrictive method of directly advancing a substantial state interest.231  But if 
the government seeks to mandate the inclusion of warnings about addiction 
in advertisements, the Court’s recent jurisprudence suggests that a more 
stringent test may govern.232 
The question of who wins the legal battle over attempted regulation is 
of tremendous import. To quote the title of David Courtwright’s work on 
“limbic capitalism,” we live in the “Age of Addiction.”233  While rates of 
addiction to expressive products remain disputed, the size of these industries 
means that even a low occurrence of problematic use may have a significant 
impact.  Nearly 70% of Americans play video games,234 while studies “have 
 
 229.  The video game industry is infamous for “crunch” culture, in which, during the weeks 
leading up to a game’s release, employees are often forced to work in excess of 80 or 100 hours per 
week.  See, e.g., Ian Williams, “You Can Sleep Here All Night”: Video Games and Labor, JACOBIN 
(Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2013/11/video-game-industry/. 
 230.  This is true regardless of whether regulation occurs at the federal or state level.  The First 
Amendment was incorporated against the states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 231.  See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (requiring that a regulation of commercial speech directly advance a substantial state 
interest). 
 232.  See Nat’l Inst. Of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (“NIFLA”), 138 S. Ct. 2361, 
2371 (2018) (holding that certain compelled speech in the form of notice was to be analyzed as a 
content-based regulation of speech because it “alter[ed] the content” of speech). 
 233.  See generally DAVID COURTWRIGHT, THE AGE OF ADDICTION (2019).  Courtwright’s 
book “chronicles the triumph of what Courtwright calls ‘limbic capitalism,’ the growing network 
of competitive businesses targeting the brain pathways responsible for feeling, motivation, and 
long-term memory.”  Age of Addiction, HARV. UNIV. PRESS, http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog 
.php?isbn=9780674737372 (last visited June 25, 2019). 
 234.  Brian Cerecente, Nearly 70% of Americans Play Video Games, Mostly on Smartphones 
(Study), VARIETY (Sept. 11, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://variety.com/2018/gaming/news/how-many-
people-play-games-in-the-u-s-1202936332/.  As discussed, the fact that 90% of respondents played 
games on their phones is especially concern, given the ultra-addictive properties of free-to-play 
mobile games.  See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text. 
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put porn consumption rates at 50% to 99% among men, and 30% to 86% 
among women.”235 
Make no mistake—the legal fights are on the horizon.236  Indeed, they 
have already begun.237  This Part seeks to preview, analyze, and provide 
guidance on the coming fights. 
For now, I set aside the question of regulations targeting only 
advertising for two reasons.  First, advertising regulations are of dubious 
value to regulators in addressing expressive addiction.  In the age of Twitch 
streaming238 and pervasive social media use, restrictions on advertising 
targeting children, for example, may be entirely ineffective.  Fortnite does 
not need to advertise to children to attract them to play; it needs only to make 
features children find attractive—say, inserting into the game silly “skins”239 
or references to their favorite superheroes240—and then allow YouTube 
videos and Twitch streamers to simply record themselves playing the game.  
Pornography, on the other hand, is not widely advertised to general 
audiences.  Even if regulators choose to target them, this inefficacy might 
 
 235.  Kirsten Weir, Is Pornography Addictive?, 45 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 46 (2014). 
 236.  See, e.g., Matthew McCaffrey, Microtransactions and Loot Boxes: Can the Video Game 
Industry Regulate Itself?, MISES INST. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://mises.org/wire/microtransactions-and-
loot-boxes-can-video-game-industry-regulate-itself (noting that “governments around the world 
are increasingly interested in regulating the use of loot boxes and other microtransactions,” with 
several U.S. states considering regulations).  See also infra Part II.A.1 (describing proposed federal 
legislation prohibiting loot boxes in video games targeted to children). 
 237.  See Edward C. Baig, Epic Games sued for not warning parents ‘Fortnite’ is allegedly as 
addictive as cocaine, USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkin 
gtech/2019/10/07/fortnite-producer-epic-games-lawsuit-says-addictive-as-cocaine/3900236002/ 
(describing lawsuit filed in Canada). 
 238.  Twitch is a platform that allows players to live-stream themselves playing games.  It is 
the 13th most popular website in the United States, and has at least 15 million daily users, who 
average 95 minutes of viewing per day.  See Blog, 2019’s 36 Most Incredible Twitch Stats, 99 
FIRMS (Apr. 23, 2019), https://99firms.com/blog/twitch-stats/. 
 239.  “Skins,” in video game parlance, are costumes worn by characters. Fortnite, already 
known for its cartoonish style, see Brandon Alimanestiano, ‘Fortnite Battle Royale’: The Cartoon 
Game You Will Never Want to Stop Playing, COLLEGIATE TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), http://www. 
collegiatetimes.com/lifestyles/fortnite-battle-royale-the-cartoon-game-you-will-never-want/articl 
e_044aa620-35d0-11e8-b64c-ab0d0253f50b.html, includes a huge variety of skins.  Fortnite 
players can dress as elves, hippies, 80s-style fitness instructors, giant cheeseburgers, gingerbread 
men, leprechauns, scarecrows, clowns, nutcracker soldiers, Easter bunnies, sharks, dinosaurs, scuba 
divers, noir-style gumshoes, witch doctors, Dia de los Muertos celebrants, Vikings, Oktoberfest 
celebrants, Jack-o-lanterns, samurai, skeletons, robots, sushi chefs, giant ice cream cones, and 
more.  See FORTNITE SKINS, https://fortniteskins.net/sets/ (last visited May 27, 2019). 
 240.  See Nick Statt, Fortnite’s Avengers: Endgame Crossover is One of the Best Superhero 
Games I’ve Ever Played, THE VERGE (Apr. 25, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://www.theverge.com/201 
9/4/25/18516452/fortnite-avengers-end-game-marvel-superheroes-crossover-event-infinity-war 
(describing an in-game event that allows players to use “Iron Man’s gloves, Hawkeye’s explosive 
bow, and Captain America’s shield”). 
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make advertising regulations unconstitutional simply because they fail 
entirely to advance a government interest.241 
Second, even if advertising regulations were effective, they would only 
be required to survive the Central Hudson test or some slightly more rigorous 
modification post-NIFLA.242  The more interesting questions are whether a 
direct regulation of addictive speech can survive strict scrutiny, or whether 
regulators can directly regulate addictive content in speech while entirely 
avoiding the First Amendment.  Because I conclude that a direct regulation 
of speech would satisfy strict scrutiny, it is likely that an advertising 
restriction would satisfy the more lenient tests. 
The second set-aside for now is pornography.  The regulation of 
pornography is an important constitutional question, and the recognition of 
pornography addiction may be a path around the equality-free speech 
impasse that constitutes current pornography jurisprudence.  But, for now, I 
am trying to isolate variables.  Unlike pornography, video games allow for 
some manner of identifying discrete bits of speech included in a product 
solely to addict consumers.  Pornography does not allow for such pristine, 
laboratory conditions; the medium is defined by its addictive features.  So, I 
leave for another day the question of what an addictive speech doctrine might 
mean for the regulation of pornography. 
Accordingly, this Part advances two arguments.  First, a direct 
regulation of addictive expression ought to satisfy strict scrutiny.  Second, 
and more fundamentally, regulators ought not need to contend with the First 
Amendment in order to regulate addictive speech; addictive “speech” should 
not be considered speech at all. 
A. The Regulation of Addictive Expression Satisfies Strict Scrutiny 
Content-based regulations of speech are highly disfavored.  Indeed, 
they “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests.”243  The regulation of intentionally addictive expression 
nonetheless can meet this high burden. 
 
 241.  See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (requiring that a regulation of commercial speech directly advance a substantial state 
interest); see also Tschida v. Motl, 924 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The confidentiality 
provision is so weak that we have difficulty seeing that it serves any state interest at all. Severe 
under inclusiveness renders the confidentiality provision unconstitutional.”). 
 242.  See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 243.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
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1. Test Case: The Protecting Children from Abusive Games Act 
In May 2019, a bipartisan group of United States senators fired an 
opening salvo against developers with the introduction of the aggressive 
Protecting Children from Abusive Games Act (“PCAGA”).244 
The PCAGA, as drafted, makes it “unlawful . . . to publish” or distribute 
a “minor-oriented game that includes pay-to-win microtransactions or loot 
boxes.”245  The act defines a “pay-to-win microtransaction” very broadly, as 
one that “eases a user’s progression through content otherwise available 
within the game” or “assists a user in accomplishing an achievement within 
the game.”246  It provides for enforcement via the Federal Trade Commission 
and by parens patriae suits by state attorneys general,247 and anticipates and 
counters a number of potential loopholes.248  Ars Technica subtly announced 
that the bill’s “expansive prohibitions could heavily impact large swathes of 
the game industry.”249  Forbes predicted that the bill “could devastate” 
publishers if passed.250 
The PCAGA’s target is, unmistakably, the intentional affliction of 
addiction.  In a press release, Senator Josh Hawley, who describes himself 
as a critic of “practices that prey on the addiction of users,” said the bill was 
about the “exploitation of children,” and targeted those developers who 
“prey on user addiction.”251  Hawley concluded: “When a game is designed 
for kids, game developers shouldn’t be allowed to monetize addiction.”252 
The legislation met swift opposition from the gaming industry and 
libertarians, but few noted what would surely be the industry’s strongest line 
of defense: that the law would violate the First Amendment by restricting the 
speech rights of developers.253  This section confronts that question in order 
 
 244.  Kyle Orland, GOP, Dem Senators Officially Introduce Loot Box, “Pay-to-Win” 
Legislation, ARS TECHNICA (May 23, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2019/05/ 
gop-dem-senators-officially-introduce-loot-box-pay-to-win-legislation/. 
 245.  Sen. Josh Hawley, Draft Legislation, available at https://www.hawley.senate.gov/ 
sites/default/files/2019-05/Loot-Box-Bill-Text.pdf.  
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Sen. Josh Hawley, Draft Legislation, available at https://www.hawley.senate.gov/ 
sites/default/files/2019-05/Loot-Box-Bill-Text.pdf. 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Orland, supra note 244. 
 250.  Dave Thier, New Microtransaction/Loot Box Bill Could Devastate Video Game 
Publishers If It Passes, FORBES (May 8, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidthi 
er/2019/05/08/new-microtransactionloot-box-bill-could-devastate-video-game-publishers-if-it-pas 
ses/#17d534d4676f. 
 251.  Press Release, Sen. Josh Hawley, Senator Hawley to Introduce Legislation banning 
Manipulative Video Game Features Aimed at Children (May 8, 2019), https://www.hawley. 
senate. gov/senator-hawley-introduce-legislation-banning-manipulative-video-game-feature 
s-aimed-children. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  One industry analyst apparently noted the connection to Free Speech Rights, but 
suggested that this was a political hurdle rather than a legal one.  Eddie Makuch, Loot Boxes Could 
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to demonstrate that regulations targeted at addictive expression satisfy strict 
scrutiny. 
2. Strict Scrutiny Analysis 
For the purposes of this analysis, assume one major amendment to the 
PCAGA prior to passage: all references to children are removed, and the act 
simply bans loot boxes in all video games.254  A developer whose games 
include loot boxes sues to prevent enforcement of the act. How might a court 
analyze whether the Act violates the First Amendment? 
a. What does it mean to be content-based? 
The first path for regulators is likely to reject the premise entirely, and 
argue that the PCAGA is not a content-based regulation of speech.  In one 
interview, for instance, Hawley was asked whether the next logical step after 
the PCAGA would be legislation protecting minors from exposure to 
pornography.  He deferred, citing the First Amendment protection of 
pornography.255  Hawley apparently does not consider the First Amendment 
to be a similar obstacle to the PCAGA. 
There is some legal precedent supporting this position.  In Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, for instance, the Supreme Court outlined two categories of 
regulation that count as content-based: those that “appl[y] to particular 
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed,” and 
those that “cannot be justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech or that were adopted . . . because of disagreement with the 
message the speech conveys.”256 
 
Be Made Illegal: New Bill Officially Introduced With Bipartisan Support, GAMESPOT (May 23, 
2019, 9:30 PM), https://www.gamespot.com/articles/loot-boxes-could-be-made-illegal-new-bill-
official/1100-6467138.  Somehow, the most straightforward statement of the First Amendment 
issue has come from the prominent absurdist Twitter account dril, who tweeted: “Donwnloadable 
[sic] Content (DLC) and Microtransactions is [sic] Protected Free Speech. (USER HAS BEEN 
BANNED FOR THIS POST).” wint (@dril), TWITTER (Aug. 15, 2019 3:59 PM), https://twit 
ter.com/dril/status/1162091367792697344.  
 254.  The PCAGA’s regulation of games targeted at children presumably eases the 
government’s justificatory burden because the government has a greater interest in protecting 
children from most harms than adults.  See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 841–42 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he regulation of communication addressed to children need not 
conform to the requirements of the First Amendment in the same way as those applicable to 
adults.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For the purposes of this analysis, relying on the special 
constitutional status of children would be—to use a video game term—a “cheese,” a purposeful 
exploitation of a mechanic that makes an encounter significantly easier than intended.  See 
Cheesing, KNOW YOUR MEME (last visited Oct. 23, 2019), https://knowyourmeme.com/mem 
es/cheesing.  
 255.  John McCormack, Josh Hawley’s Virtue Politics, NAT’L REV. (June 20, 2019, 10:38 
AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/07/08/josh-hawleys-virtue-politics/. 
 256.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted). 
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At first glance, a prohibition on loot boxes appears not to fall in either 
category.  Loot boxes do not discuss any topics or express any message.  In 
one sense, as contrasted with a game’s message, level design, and dialogue, 
a loot box system is more like a kernel of purely economic activity contained 
within the confines of a broader collection of “speech.”  This may have been 
Hawley’s implicit argument when he said that loot boxes “are casinos 
essentially getting inserted into kids’ games.”257 
This argument has some legal force behind it.  In an early skirmish in 
the coming regulatory battle, in 2017, the County of Milwaukee enacted an 
ordinance requiring developers of augmented reality (“AR”) games with 
location-based features to apply for and receive a permit before users could 
play the games in Milwaukee County parks.258  After swiftly dispatching the 
county’s argument that the game at issue—which, for some reason, used 
location-based AR to facilitate a game of Texas Hold ‘Em poker—was not 
speech at all,259 the Eastern District of Wisconsin then rejected the 
developer’s argument that the ordinance was content-based.  It noted that the 
regulation “imposes restrictions on functionalities . . . regardless of their 
content.”260  The regulation applied whether the game was about “poker, 
zombie-killing, or Pokémon catching.”261  Therefore, because “the 
distinction is the mode or channel of speech, not its content,” the court 
concluded the regulation was content-neutral.262  Theoretically, a regulation 
targeting loot-boxes is no different than one targeting location-based AR 
features—both are functions rather than messages. 
But this argument proves too much.  Reed itself broadens its initial 
category of content-based regulations by noting that some of these 
regulations “are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or 
purpose.”263  A law targeting loot boxes probably fits into this broader 
definition because it targets a particular subset of protected code that has the 
function or purpose of implementing and executing a loot box system. 
Furthermore, as the court in Candy Lab acknowledged, Brown “seems 
to treat the literary and interactive aspects (physical or virtual) of video 
gaming as an undivided, expressive whole.”264  From this, the court 
concluded, Brown might imply that a regulation that targeted “the physical 
 
 257.  McCormack, supra note 255. 
 258.  Candy Lab v. Milwaukee Cty., 266 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1142–43 (E.D. Wis. 2017).  A 
location-based AR game is one in which “players interact with digital content in designated 
geolocations.”  Id. at 1142.  Apparently, players of the hit Pokémon Go did significant damage to 
Milwaukee County parks, prompting the ordinance.  Id. at 1141. 
 259.  Id. at 1146. 
 260.  Id. at 1149. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 264.  Candy Lab, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 1150. 
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act of game-playing, which is itself a part of the expression” was content-
based.265  Unwilling to go so far as to declare gaming to be inherently 
expressive, the court retreated to its finding of content neutrality. 
This is the wrong lesson from Brown’s holistic approach.  Because a 
game is an undivided whole, prohibiting a function within the game is a 
content-based regulation of the game.  In real-world terms, this is literally 
censorship—developers are not allowed to publish certain lines of code.  A 
prohibition on code that executes a loot box system is just as content based 
as a prohibition on code that causes a character to talk about the legitimacy 
of violent revolution against the capitalist class. 
The unworkability of the argument for content neutrality can be easily 
demonstrated by imagining similar regulations targeted at meta-features of 
other expressive products, such as a law prohibiting the release of any movie 
featuring the use of extended tracking shots.  Tracking shots do not 
inherently convey a message.266  But of course, that regulation would be 
content-based, as would be one that strictly delineates the lengths of book 
chapters, or one that bans plot twists in early episodes of made-for-streaming 
television shows, given that early plot twists intentionally induce compulsive 
viewing.267 
Like novels, movies, and television shows, video games are unified 
works of expression.  When the government tells developers that they can or 
cannot include certain functions in a game, it regulates on the basis of the 
game’s content. 
b. Anti-loot box regulations survive strict scrutiny 
Content-based laws are “presumptively unconstitutional,”268 and their 
survival requires the government to show that its restrictions are “narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling interest.”269  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court 
itself is constantly roiling with internal debate about whether majorities or 
dissents are actually applying the tests they purport to apply.270 
 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  See Jessica Kiang, Ranking the 20 Greatest, Most Celebrated Long Takes, INDIEWIRE 
(Mar. 27, 2014, 2:39 PM), https://www.indiewire.com/2014/03/ranking-the-20-greatest-most-cele 
brated-long-takes-87699/ (arguing that celebration of tracking shots amounts to a “fetishization of 
form over content,” and arguing that some uses of tracking shots amount to “look at me!  I haven’t 
used a cut in minutes!” rather than serving “a definite narrative purpose”). 
 267.  See Jason Lynch, Here’s the Recipe Netflix Uses to Make Binge-Worthy TV, QUARTZ 
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://qz.com/367117/heres-the-recipe-netflix-uses-to-make-binge-worthy-tv/. 
 268.  Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226. 
 269.  See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015). 
 270.  See Joseph Blocher & Luke Morgan, Doctrinal Dynamism, Borrowing, and the 
Relationship Between Rules and Rights, 28 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. (forthcoming 2019) 
(noting that merely evoking a doctrinal test does not necessarily ensure that the test is being 
consistently or properly applied). 
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Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar is a good example.  The Majority 
Opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, purported to apply strict 
scrutiny, and upheld a ban on candidate solicitations in judicial elections.271  
Justice Stephen Breyer concurred, but argued that the tiers of scrutiny should 
not be mechanical tests at all.272  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, but 
argued that regulations of judicial elections should not be subject to strict 
scrutiny.273  Justice Antonin Scalia dissented, stating that the regulation 
“straightforward[ly]” failed strict scrutiny.274  Justice Anthony Kennedy, 
also dissenting, castigated the Majority’s “error in the application of strict 
scrutiny,” writing that its “evisceration of that judicial standard now risks 
long-term harm” to the test.275  Justice Samuel Alito added: “[T]his rule is 
about as narrowly tailored as a burlap bag.”276 
With this caveat in mind, there is no reason that a prohibition on loot 
boxes should fail strict scrutiny. 
i. Compelling Interest 
The strict scrutiny test is best run in reverse; only after identifying the 
compelling governmental interest served by a regulation can you determine 
whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 
A compelling interest is one in which “the factual situation 
demonstrates a real need for the government to act to protect its interests.”277  
A compelling interest need not necessarily be a matter of life and death.278  
But aesthetic concerns, for instance, “have never been held to be compelling” 
enough to support a speech regulation.279  The state must “specifically 
identify an actual problem in need of solving.”280 
The Court extensively analyzed the question of compelling interest 
when adjudicating California’s prohibition of the sale of violent video games 
 
 271.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1672. 
 272.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1673. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 275.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 276.  Id. at 1687 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 277.  Wilson v. City of Bel-Nor, 924 F.3d 995, 1001 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 278.  See, e.g., Tschida v. Motl, 924 F.3d 1297, 1304 (9th Cir. 2019) (“We agree that the State 
has a compelling interest in protecting certain kinds of private information about unelected 
officials.”).  It is not clear whether the difference is necessarily reflected in doctrine, but in religious 
liberty cases, courts often use more stark language about the level of government interest required 
to justify regulation.  See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“[I]n this highly 
sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give 
occasion for permissible limitation.”). 
 279.  Wilson, 924 F.3d at 1001. 
 280.  Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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to minors in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.281  Justice 
Breyer concluded that the statute furthered two compelling interests: 
protecting the “physical and psychological well-being of minors,”282 and 
assisting parents in discharging parental responsibilities.283  The Majority 
Opinion at times appears to agree that those interests are compelling,284 and 
at times calls into question the seriousness of the interests.285 
Ultimately—perhaps ironically—Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion is 
best understood as utilizing the nonmechanical approach to strict scrutiny 
endorsed by Justice Breyer, by evaluating “the degree to which the statute 
injures speech-related interests, the nature of the potentially-justifying 
‘compelling interests,’ the degree to which the statute furthers that interest, 
[and] the nature and effectiveness of possible alternatives,” and then 
deciding whether, overall, the statute’s speech harms are out of proportion 
to its benefits.286  There is no other way to read Justice Scalia’s statement 
that “the government does not have a compelling interest in each marginal 
percentage point by which its goals are advanced.”287  Under the traditional 
approach to strict scrutiny, the “compelling interest” inquiry is restricted to 
the nature of the interest, with the concern Justice Scalia raises being more 
a question of narrow tailoring—does the statute restrict too much speech 
relative to its benefits?  In Brown, Justice Scalia blends those inquiries, 
limiting its usefulness as guidance about what kinds of compelling interests 
will suffice to justify video game regulations. 
At least rhetorically, Brown is an obstacle in the PCAGA’s path.  The 
Brown Court held that a prohibition on the sale of violent video games to 
minors did not satisfy strict scrutiny.288  As a matter of intuition, it would 
seem more difficult to justify a total prohibition289 on loot boxes in video 
 
 281.  See id. at 799-805 (majority opinion); 849-51 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 282.  Id. at 850. 
 283.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 849. 
 284.  See id., 564 U.S. at 805 (“California’s legislation straddles the fence between (1) 
addressing a serious social problem and (2) helping concerned parents control their children.  Both 
ends are legitimate, but when they affect First Amendment rights they must be pursued by means 
that are neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive.”). 
 285.  See id. at 803 (“This [voluntary game rating] system does much to ensure that minors 
cannot purchase seriously violent games on their own, and that parents who care about the matter 
can readily evaluate the games their children bring home.  Filling the remaining modest gap in 
concerned-parents’ control can hardly be a compelling state interest.”), 803 n.9 (“Even if the sale 
of violent video games to minors could be deterred further by increasing regulation, the government 
does not have a compelling interest in each marginal percentage point by which its goals are 
advanced.”). 
 286.  See id. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing this approach to strict scrutiny). 
 287.  Id. at 803 n.9. 
 288.  Id. at 805. 
 289.  See Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353911, at 13-19 (discussing the significance and difficulty in First 
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games, including those in games targeted at adults.  The California 
legislation, by contrast, “impose[d] no more than a modest restriction on 
expression”—no violent video games were banned; the legislation only 
affected who could purchase them.290 
But nothing from Brown can be read to cast doubt on the seriousness of 
the government’s interest in passing the PCAGA.  First, the PCAGA 
advances the compelling interest of protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of children and adolescents.291  A total prohibition 
on loot boxes in video games ensures that minors cannot fall prey to a loot 
box system, and in fact, more thoroughly advances this interest than a 
prohibition on loot boxes in games targeting minors, because it is common 
knowledge that minors play video games targeting adults.292 Second, a 
prohibition on loot boxes serves the government’s compelling interest in 
preventing the development of video game addictions.  Preventing addiction 
has been a legitimate regulatory goal since the founding of the United 
States,293 and thousands of years prior.294  The aggregate impacts of addiction 
on society can be serious295 and justify regulatory intervention. 
The largest threat Brown poses to the PCAGA in the context of the 
government’s compelling interest is the Court’s willingness to view the 
psychological evidence linking video games and violence with extreme 
skepticism.296  The Court rejected the state’s contention that its legislature 
was entitled “to make a predictive judgment that such a link exists, based on 
competing psychological studies.”297  The Court castigated the evidence 
upon which California relied as “not compelling,” “based on correlation, not 
evidence of causation,” and suggested that the effects shown to be produced 
by exposure to violent games was “indistinguishable from effects produced 
by other media.”298  Only Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, 
appeared to take seriously the proposition that violent video games were 
different in kind from depictions of violence in other media.299 
 
Amendment law in distinguishing between an unconstitutional “ban” and a constitutional 
regulation, mirroring the denominator problem in takings cases). 
 290.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 848-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 291.  See id. at 850. 
 292.  See id. at 803 n.9 (describing FTC report detailing minors’ access to video games rated 
“M” for Mature). 
 293.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 294.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 295.  See supra notes 66, 151-68, 212, and accompanying text. 
 296.  See Brown, 564 U.S. at 799-801 (questioning evidence of link between video games and 
violence). 
 297.  Id. at 800. 
 298.  Id. at 800-01. 
 299.  See id. at 816-21 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing violence in video games). 
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Subsequent research continues to provide conflicting results as to the 
causal link between violent video games and real-world violence.300  And, as 
discussed, research into video game addiction is still in its early stages,301 but 
the DSM-V’s call for further research into “Internet gaming disorder”302 is a 
significant step that will result in further research.  Ultimately, there is no 
easy solution to this particular obstacle,303 except to argue that the evidence 
of video game addiction seems compelling, and that loot boxes, in particular, 
effectively mimic gambling, and that the existence of gambling addiction is 
almost universally acknowledged.304 
Setting aside the morass of the sufficiency of the scientific evidence, 
the PCAGA should advance at least two305 interests important enough to 
consider “compelling.”  The analysis moves on to whether the law is 
narrowly tailored in pursuing those interests. 
ii. Narrow Tailoring 
Narrow tailoring requires, in the first instance, “a genuine nexus” 
between a regulation and the interest that it seeks to serve.306  If such a nexus 
exists, the government must then show that there is no “less restrictive 
alternative that would be at least as effective”307—when subject to strict 
scrutiny, the government can regulate no more speech than is necessary.  Far 
more so than the compelling interest requirement, the narrow tailoring 
requirement poses a serious threat to a loot box prohibition. 
 
 300.  Compare Andrew K. Przybylski & Netta Weinstein, Violent Video Game Engagement is 
Not Associated with Adolescents’ Aggressive Behavior: Evidence From a Registered Report, 6 
ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCI. (2019) (finding no causal relationship between violent game exposure 
and caretaker assessments of aggressive behavior in adolescents), with Sandra L. Calvert et al., The 
American Psychological Association Task Force Assessment of Violent Video Games, 72 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 126 (2017) (conducting a meta-review of studies published between 2009 and 
2013, and concluding that violent video game exposure was associated with a range of aggressive 
and antisocial behavior). 
 301.  See supra Part I.C.1.a. 
 302.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 303.  See generally Ben K. Grunwald, Comment, Suboptimal Social Science and Judicial 
Precedent, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1409 (2013); William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional 
Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (2013).  
For a more focused discussion on the problem of uncertain social science and Brown in particular, 
see generally William K. Ford, The Law and Science of Video Game Violence: What Was Lost in 
Translation, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297 (2013). 
 304.  See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
 305.  The PCAGA may advance other compelling interests.  For example, it would presumably 
aid in the discharge of parental responsibilities.  See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 
849 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  For the sake of avoiding diminishing marginal returns by running 
down a list of progressively weaker interests, I focus on the two mentioned. 
 306.  Wilson v. City of Bel-Nor, 924 F.3d 995, 1002 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 307.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The doctrine of underinclusivity fits between the questions of 
compelling interest and narrow tailoring, because it “raises serious doubts 
about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes.”308  
A statute raises an underinclusivity concern when “the State regulates one 
aspect of a problem while declining to regulate a different aspect of the 
problem that affects its stated interest in a comparable way.”309  In practice, 
this “requires lawmakers to thread a very fine needle’s eye between too little 
and too much regulation.”310 
The Court in Brown found underinclusivity “alone enough” to defeat 
the California statute, because “California has singled out the purveyors of 
video games for disfavored treatment—at least when compared to 
booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers—and has given no persuasive 
reason why.”311  This would seem to cast doubt on a prohibition on loot boxes 
because they are merely one vector of addiction contained solely in one 
medium of communication.  Even, or especially, if the PCAGA were 
considered to be a version of a gambling regulation, a reviewing court might 
legitimately wonder how a government allows some legal gambling and not 
loot boxes. 
The Court’s underinclusivity analysis in Brown has been subject to 
criticism.312  The doctrine is “extremely malleable,” and can be used to kill 
a statute or can be ignored as a court defers to the legislature’s political and 
policy choices to regulate one area and not another.313  And the Court has 
since appeared to dial the doctrine back—over Justice Scalia’s 
objections314—with Chief Justice Roberts writing that the First Amendment 
“does not put a State to [an] all-or-nothing choice,” and that the Court should 
not punish the state for “leaving open more, rather than fewer, avenues of 
expression, especially when there is no indication that the selective 
restriction of speech reflects a pretextual motive.”315  A majority of justices 
agreed that “the First Amendment imposes no freestanding 
‘underinclusiveness limitation,’” and noted that the Court has upheld laws 
that “conceivably could have restricted even greater amounts of speech in 
service of their stated interests.”316 
Is the PCAGA fatally underinclusive?  Because of the malleability of 
the doctrine, it is difficult to definitively answer this question.  One might 
 
 308.  Id. at 802. 
 309.  Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1670 (2015). 
 310.  Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First Amendment: The Legislative Right to Nibble 
at Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 525, 525 (2016). 
 311.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 802. 
 312.  E.g., Michael Coenen, More Restrictive Alternatives, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1, 73–75 (2017). 
 313.  Calvert, supra note 310, at 574. 
 314.  Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1681. 
 315.  Id. at 1670. 
 316.  Id. at 1668. 
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argue against the PCAGA that, by targeting only loot boxes, the legislation 
in fact leaves in place any number of addictive elements in video games, 
such as social interaction, levelling up, vibrant graphics, or repetitive 
mechanics that generate a feeling of competence.  On the other hand, a 
legislature might conclude that loot boxes are different because they serve 
no valuable gameplay interest to the player; they exist only to generate 
revenue, and induce compulsive playing.  This, in turn, also rebuts the 
concern about pretext, ensuring to a court that the legislature is not simply 
singling out video games.317 
As for the decision to only target video games, the application of the 
underinclusivity doctrine in this context would amount to a declaration that 
a legislature could not address the problem of video game addiction at all, 
and must address addiction in a more comprehensive piece of legislation.  
This generates perverse incentives; a court should generally want to 
encourage legislatures to regulate with precision and care around social 
problems, especially when they interact with constitutional rights.318 
And with respect to the protection of children, the only argument for 
underinclusivity is the one made by Justice Scalia in Brown; that legislators 
should be targeting other vectors of addiction for children.319  Of course, 
legislatures do attempt protect children from cigarette addiction, gambling 
addiction, alcohol addiction, and the like.320  And unlike another feature of 
the California law that the Majority found problematic in Brown, the 
PCAGA contains no “parental veto” that would allow children to access 
problematic games anyway.321  The PCAGA completely prohibits games 
with loot boxes. 
That fact, in turn, leads to the question of overinclusiveness.  Unlike 
underinclusiveness, overinclusiveness—the core of the narrow tailoring 
inquiry—is always fatal.322  Strict scrutiny requires lawmakers to use “the 
least restrictive means” to meaningfully serve their compelling interest.323  
The only reprieve is that alternative means have to be at least as effective in 
advancing the government’s interest.324  This aspect is perhaps more 
accurately defined as requiring an efficiency calculation: units of speech 
 
 317.  See supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
 318.  See Coenen, supra note 312, at 73-75 (arguing that Scalia’s invocation of the 
underinclusivity doctrine in Brown was inappropriate, in part because Scalia rightly concluded that 
California was “wise” in not attempting to regulate minors’ access to other forms of communication 
that had potential correlative relationships with violent behavior, suggesting that the California 
legislation’s limited scope was an attempt to comply with the First Amendment’s mandates). 
 319.  See Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 801-02 (2011). 
 320.  See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 321.  See Brown, 564 U.S. at 805 (2011). 
 322.  Calvert, supra note 310, at 573-74. 
 323.  McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014). 
 324.  Brown, 564 U.S. at 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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restricted per unit of social good from regulation.  Regulators are not 
required to choose a less efficient alternative simply because it also restricts 
less speech.325 
As to the compelling interest in protecting children’s well-being, the 
PCAGA would likely be considered overinclusive, because it completely 
restricts the ability of consenting adults to access and play games with loot 
box systems.  While a total prohibition also serves the well-being of minors, 
by eliminating a way for adults to give games with loot boxes to children, it 
does so in a manner that restricts more speech than is necessary.  The law 
could, for example, prohibit the sale of games with loot boxes to minors, and 
contain legal mechanisms to stop adults from transferring such games to 
children.  It would likely be somewhat less effective, but it would be far more 
efficient.326 
But the PCAGA is saved from flunking strict scrutiny because it is not 
overinclusive in addressing the goal of preventing video game addiction.  
Indeed, a prohibition on loot boxes is a relatively narrow regulatory 
intervention into a particularly troublesome feature in modern video games.  
That feature is one that expresses no meaningful message; it exists solely to 
induce problematic consumption and the resulting monetary gain for 
developers.  Accordingly, the PCAGA restricts relatively little speech—and 
even less of what one could call “valuable” speech327—and leaves video 
game developers free to pursue games with any ideological, political, or 
social message.  It should survive strict scrutiny. 
B. Addictive Expression Should Not Be Covered Speech 
Although regulations targeted at addictive expression have a strong 
argument for surviving strict scrutiny, the test is nonetheless an 
extraordinarily difficult one.  Laws subject to a free speech strict scrutiny 
analysis are struck down roughly 80% of the time,328 and the Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that laws that survive strict scrutiny will be “rare.”329  
Regulators stand a much better chance of meaningfully addressing the 
 
 325.  Cf. Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 403-04 (2003) 
(questioning whether a least restrictive means analysis is meaningfully different in practice from a 
cost-benefit analysis). 
 326.  See Brown, 564 U.S. at 803 n.9 (noting that even if regulation were constitutional, 
increased regulation that restricted more speech in order to achieve marginal increases in 
effectiveness were not necessarily constitutional), 847 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing a similar 
non-mechanical approach to strict scrutiny that involves weighing whether the amount of speech 
restricted is outweighed by the benefits of regulation). 
 327.  See infra Part II.B. 
 328.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict 
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006).  Video game regulations have, 
if anything, fared even worse.  See Clark, supra note 38, and O’Holleran, supra note 39. 
 329.  United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000). 
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problems associated with expressive addiction if they can convince a 
reviewing court that their regulations do not restrict “speech” at all. 
For First Amendment purposes, most speech (and some non-speech) is 
“speech.”  But several genres of actual communication are not “speech” 
within the meaning of the First Amendment.330  The generally accepted list 
of these unprotected categories of speech includes: incitement, true threats, 
fighting words, speech incident to criminal conduct (including, for example, 
fraud, blackmail, perjury, etc.), and obscenity.331 
Speech intended solely to induce pathological addiction should be 
included on that list.  There are a number of reasons why.  First, addictive 
expression is not communicative.  It does not aim to provoke cognition in its 
listeners; indeed, it hopes to bypass cognition and exploit “predictably 
irrational” chemical reactions in the brain to induce consumption.  Second, 
addictive expression actively does damage to the core interests at the heart 
of the free speech guarantee—the protection of autonomy, the promotion of 
truth, and the fostering of democratic self-governance.  Finally, it can be 
analogized to the existing exceptions, and the longstanding acceptance of 
regulations targeting addiction provide the historical pedigree to justify its 
exclusion from the First Amendment’s coverage. 
1. Intentionally Addictive Expression is Low-Value Speech 
a. Noncognitive and Noncommunicative 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of the right to free speech exists to 
protect the communication of ideas.  Addictive expression does not 
communicate a message.  It has no ideas.  And it is certainly the case that 
there is no need for addictive expression in order for ideas to be expressed.  
Indeed, addictive expression tends to degrade the communication of ideas by 
appealing to noncognitive, automatic processes in the brain. There is no 
reason to treat it as speech. 
Despite near-universal agreement with the proposition that the Free 
Speech Clause “was fashioned to assure unfettered exchange of ideas to 
bring about political and social change desired by the people,”332 there is also 
near-universal agreement with the Court’s “reassuring[] declar[ation]” that 
 
 330.  Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The Constitutionality of a Prohibition 
on Carrying Firearms At Political Demonstrations, 68 DUKE L.J. 175, 185-86 (2018). 
 331.  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717-18 (2012). 
 332.  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
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speech with no clear message such as nonrepresentational art or nonsense 
verse is protected.333 Reconciling these two ideas has proven difficult.334 
But it need not be.  The way to reconcile an Amendment intended to 
protect meaningful speech but needed to protect some meaningless speech is 
to discover which meaningless speech merits protection, and which does not.  
The existing categorical exceptions—obscenity, incitement, and the like—
provide us with several outputs of that equation.  The rest is just filling in 
variables. 
Scholars like Cass Sunstein and Geoffrey Stone have convincingly 
argued that the cognitive/noncognitive335 distinction is at least one workable 
way to do so.336  The relationship between speech and cognition exists in two 
dimensions.  First, speech might be expressed in a manner that either 
encourages or discourages cognition.337  Second, a speaker may subjectively 
intend for her speech to encourage or discourage cognition.338  The speaker’s 
intent can also be divined, in some cases, from the manner in which she has 
chosen to speak.339 
The cognitive/noncognitive distinction goes a long way to explaining 
the current categorical exceptions from free speech coverage.  Obscenity, for 
example, is constitutionally defined as those materials that “appeal to the 
prurient interest in sex” without containing “serious literary, artistic, 
 
 333.  Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First 
Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 1425-26 (2014). 
 334.  See Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 
170 (2012). 
 335.  The definitional problems in this inquiry are, obviously, fraught.  Sunstein defines speech 
as cognitive if it “is intended to or does in fact impart knowledge in any sense.”  Cass R. Sunstein, 
Essay, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 603.  Like Sunstein, I rely on 
Frederick Schauer’s earlier wrestling with the idea.  Whether speech is cognitive should not be 
limited by the term’s “technical sense.  To react cognitively is to react mentally, or  
intellectually . . . .”  Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An 
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922 n.137 (1979).  See 
also id. at 922 (referring to “the idea of cognitive content, of mental effect, of a communication 
designed to appeal to the intellectual process” and disclaiming the “unwieldy philosophical 
baggage” associated with the term).  The best definition is probably that offered offhand by Stone.  
Cognitive speech “engages the thought process and attempts to reinforce or alter opinions and 
attitudes by rational persuasion.”  Geoffrey R. Stone, Essay, Sex, Violence, and the First 
Amendment, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1857, 1864 (2007). 
 336.  See Stone, supra note 335, at 1863-1865; Sunstein, supra note 335, at 603.  See generally 
Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, The First Amendment and Cognition: A Response, 1989 DUKE L.J. 433.  
See also LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (2d ed. 1988) (“It is not 
plausible to uphold the right to use words as projectiles where no exchange of views is involved.”). 
 337.  Sunstein, supra note 335, at 603; Stone, supra note 335, at 1864-65. 
 338.  Sunstein, supra note 335, at 603-04 (“Third, the purpose of the speaker is relevant: if the 
speaker is seeking to communicate a message, he will be treated more favorably than if he is not.”). 
 339.  Id. at 607-08 (“The pornographer’s purpose in disseminating pornographic materials—to 
produce sexual arousal—can be determined by the nature of the material.”). 
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political, or scientific value.”340  To “appeal to the prurient interest in sex” is 
to have “a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.”341  Obscenity, then, is defined 
by the Court as that speech that arouses without encouraging any intellectual 
activity.342  Likewise, the exception for incitement is aimed at those rabble-
rousers whose “[e]loquence may set fire to reason.”343  Threats are made 
through speech but their “primary effect is analogous to twisting someone’s 
arm”—they “affect people’s behavior not by persuasion but by coercion.”344 
Going down the list of exceptions one-by-one reveals that each can be 
explained, at least in part, by the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction.  The 
possible exception is speech incident to criminal conduct—fraud, for 
example, is certainly cognitive (although blackmail is closer to a threat in 
terms of its intellectual force).  But the logic is much the same.  Speech 
incident to criminal conduct is not uttered in order to convey a message, but 
rather to further a crime.  In that sense, it is noncognitive: the speaker is not 
seeking to “engage the thought process” or to “reinforce or alter opinions 
and attitudes by rational persuasion.”345 
Of course, the cognitive/noncognitive distinction has been subject to 
fierce criticism.346  The response, at its core, is that that the distinction is 
illusory, and that all “speech” is processed intellectually.  “Expression 
always reaches us through some imaginative pattern or patterns that we 
already understand.”347  For instance, upon viewing the same pornography, 
some will be aroused, others repulsed, others enraged; this variance alone is 
said to disprove a theory of automatic, instinctual noncognition.348  Music, 
similarly, is nothing but a series of sounds, which the human brain has to 
interpret for any “instinctual” emotive effect to take place.349  And of course 
it is obviously true that “much speech with noncognitive components is 
entitled to the highest degree of constitutional protection.”350 
But the critics of the distinction overstate the case against it.  The 
cognitive/noncognitive distinction need not be totally explanatory of the 
 
 340.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 341.  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957). 
 342.  See Sunstein, supra note 335, at 603 n.88; Schauer, supra note 335, at 918 (“The purpose 
of the legal or constitutional definition of obscenity is to isolate that which lacks cognitive or 
intellectual content . . . .  Material which appeals to the prurient interest is intended to, and does in 
fact, produce a physical or quasi-physical stimulus rather than a mental effect.”). 
 343.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 344.  Stone, supra note 335, at 1864. 
 345.  Id. 
 346.  See, e.g., Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 420, 422. 
 347.  Id. at 429. 
 348.  See id. at 429-30. 
 349.  Emily Campbell, Obscenity, Music and the First Amendment: Was The Crew 2 Lively?, 
15 NOVA L. REV. 159, 219-20 (1991). 
 350.  Sunstein, supra note 336, at 433. 
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categorical exceptions, and need not be a perfect dichotomy, in order to add 
value to First Amendment analysis.  On the other hand, though, to argue that 
there is no such distinction would entirely wipe out core assumptions about 
the First Amendment and democratic society in general.351  For instance, 
although First Amendment doctrine does not necessarily reflect preferential 
treatment for political speech over any other kind of protected speech, there 
is no doubt that there is—almost unanimously among jurists and 
academics—at least a rhetorical preference for political speech.352  Such a 
preference would be impossible to justify without a cognitive/noncognitive 
distinction.  That the distinction is not as crisp as one would prefer in one’s 
constitutional doctrine does not obviate that it is—it must be—relevant as a 
tool to decide which “meaningless” (or message-less) speech merits 
protection.  Music, nonrepresentational art, and erotica all invite cognition; 
threats, incitement, and obscenity all seek to foreclose it. 
So, while it may be wrong to think of the cognitive/noncognitive 
distinction as a dichotomy, a gradient or spectrum can nonetheless be 
generated. Locating speech along that spectrum is an important initial guide 
for how the First Amendment ought to treat that speech.  Intentionally 
addictive speech, on the whole, fares poorly.353  Addiction is a dysfunction 
in the brain’s reward and motivation circuitry.354  An addict’s brain is 
literally and physically altered, rewired to pathologically pursue dopamine 
and serotonin rewards,355 even at extreme costs to the individual.356  Addicts 
do not even like the subject of their addiction; they need it.357  Freedom of 
speech should not include the freedom to inflict a disease. 
There is another way of getting at the same argument.  One might 
imagine the kind of pluralistic society the First Amendment is intended to 
foster, raucous with rational debate on important public issues, brimming 
 
 351.  See id. at 434 (describing the erasure of the cognitive/noncognitive distinction as 
“antithetical to the basic logic of a system of free expression, which places a high premium on the 
process of discussion and deliberation among people with different views”). 
 352.  See, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010) (“Speech is an essential 
mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . .  The 
First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign 
for political office.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 353.  Unintentionally addictive, or inherently addictive speech, may fare less poorly.  For 
instance, to the extent that the speaker’s intent matters, the intent of the pornographer is apparently 
less to addict than to arouse (or at least, there’s no evidence, unlike with video games, that porn 
producers are intentionally exploiting addiction).  From Sunstein’s perspective, this is essentially 
an intent to not convey a message, and is a relevant factor against protecting speech.  From my 
perspective, an intent to arouse is significantly less problematic than an intent to addict, and I would 
treat intentionally addictive speech more unfavorably than unintentionally addictive speech. 
 354.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 355.  See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
 356.  See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 357.  See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text. 
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with art and music, bursting with dissent, humming with democratic energy.  
And then, simply, work backwards from there.  What sort of speech 
protections are necessary to make that society happen? 
Any constitutional speech protections not necessary to generate that 
society would, in most other constitutional contexts, be viewed with some 
suspicion.  The Constitution’s constraints on government action are, for the 
most part, strictly construed in order to preserve wide latitude for 
lawmakers.358  The default test for the constitutionality of government action, 
after all, is mere rational basis review, which protects even in-fact irrational 
actions if any set of facts exist that could justify the action.359  And the 
general presumption of constitutionality is part of why courts prefer as-
applied challenges over facial challenges to a law’s constitutionality,360 and 
why constitutional decisions are avoided, if possible.361 
The First Amendment is somewhat of an exception to this rule.  First 
Amendment claimants, for example, can press an overbreadth claim even if 
their speech could have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrower 
statute.362  But the exception is not limitless.  If speech does not advance First 
Amendment interests; indeed, if it does not even involve the communication 
of ideas or emotions at all, there is little reason to shield such speech from 
democratic lawmaking. 
Intentionally addictive expression, in the end, “is not needed to express 
any idea.”363  It plays “no essential part in any expression of ideas.”364  As 
such, “[i]n order to have a society in which public issues can be openly and 
vigorously debated, it is not necessary to allow” intentionally addictive 
expression to wreak havoc.365  Ideas are debated and accepted every day 
without reliance on addictive speech.  Regulators can, for example, safely 
 
 358.  Or, put another way, statutes are strictly construed to avoid bumping into the 
constitutional guarantee.  See infra note 361.  There are some instances of strict constructions of 
constitutional language—the exact timing of when a criminal suspect is entitled to a lawyer being 
one example—but whether the statute or the Constitution is being narrowly construed is irrelevant; 
the point is that courts purport to bend over backwards to avoid finding a government action of 
questionable constitutionality to be unconstitutional. 
 359.  See USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (defining the rational basis test as 
whether challenged action “is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest”). 
 360.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (“[A]s applied challenges are the basic 
building blocks of constitutional adjudication.”) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1328 (2000)).  
 361.  See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005) (“If one of [two statutory 
constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail—
whether or not those constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the court.”). 
 362.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). 
 363.  See Iancu v. Brunetti 139 S. Ct., 2294, 2318 at 2303 (June 24, 2019) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
 364.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 365.  See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 475 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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ban loot boxes without fear of censoring an iota of content with serious 
ideological, political, social, literary, scientific, or artistic merit.  Addictive 
expression “has no value,” and proscribing it would “not chill any valuable 
speech.”366 
Accordingly, regulators may do so without violating the First 
Amendment. 
b. Actively Harms First Amendment Interests 
It is also possible to disaggregate the specific interests that the First 
Amendment serves, and then to measure a genre of speech against those 
interests.  While a minority view speech itself as a fundamental good, for the 
most part there exists unanimity in the idea that speech, and therefore also 
its protection, is only instrumental.367  Accordingly, constitutional protection 
for speech is “normatively defensible only if [it] serves relevant 
constitutional values.”368 
There is also widespread agreement on the three such values that the 
First Amendment serves: autonomy, the discovery of truth in the 
marketplace of ideas, and democracy.369  Each purposive theory of the 
Amendment has its adherents and critics, and many argue that the 
Amendment advances all three interests,370 or that the search for a “free 
speech principle” is a fool’s errand.371  But even those critics acknowledge 
that First Amendment scholarship has generated “a more or less standard list 
of such candidates.”372  These values animate First Amendment law: 
 
Commentators and jurists have long searched for an explanation of 
the true value served by the first amendment’s protection of free 
speech.  This issue certainly has considerable intellectual appeal, 
and the practical stakes are also high.  For the answer we give to the 
question what value does free speech serve may well determine the 
 
 366.  See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 739 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 367.  See, e.g., Mark G. Yudof, Review, In Search of a Free Speech Principle, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 680, 683 (1984) (quoting Michael Sokolow as proposing the following comprehensive free 
speech principle: “If speech . . . is more likely than not to lead to democracy, truth, and individual 
fulfillment . . . then government cannot prohibit the utterance of that speech”). 
 368.  Blocher, supra note 333, at 1441. 
 369.  See, e.g., id. (listing autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and democracy as the “relevant 
constitutional values”); Yudof, supra note 367, at 682 (same). 
 370.  See, e.g., Yudof, supra note 367, at 682 (“[O]ne may not believe that free expression 
invariably advances the truth, strengthens individual autonomy, or is a necessary condition for 
democracy. But the three arguments together might well support a free speech principle.”). 
 371.  See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1271 
(1995) (“There is in fact no general free speech principle . . . .  Each of these values seems pressing 
when applied to speech in some situations, but not when applied to speech in other situations.”). 
 372.  Id. 
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extent of constitutional protection to be given to such forms of 
expression as literature, art, science, commercial speech, and speech 
related to the political process.373 
 
This Part marshals each purposive theory of the First Amendment in 
turn to show that addictive expression does not advance, but instead actively 
hinders, human autonomy, the promotion of truth through the marketplace 
of ideas, and the fostering of democracy.  Accordingly, addictive expression 
is exceptionally low-value speech, not deserving of protection. 
i. Compulsion and Autonomy 
The most fundamental and far-reaching374 of the purposive models of 
the First Amendment is the proposition that the Constitution protects 
expression because to censor speech is a powerful violation of a fundamental 
human right to think and behave as she sees fit, so long as she does not harm 
another.375  The importance in protecting speech does not necessarily lie in 
the fact that protecting speech generates more of it; rather, protection serves 
to guarantee individuals the ability to choose whether to speak, and about 
what to speak, and what to say about those topics.  If, at the end of that 
decisional process, the individual decides not to say anything, or decides to 
say something about a banal topic, or decides to say something hideous about 
an important topic, so be it.  The good that the First Amendment has wrought 
is in the cognitive activity in which the individual engaged.376  If the 
government lurked ready and able to punish speech, that cognition would be 
strangled in its crib; to prevent that, speech is protected. 
The autonomy theory, taken to its logical extreme, utterly rejects the 
very idea of “low-value speech,” and veers toward considering speech itself 
a fundamental good.377  If it does not matter what one says or what one talks 
 
 373.  Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982). 
 374.  See Blocher, supra note 333, at 1499 (referring to the autonomy theory as “[t]he most 
potentially expansive theory of the First Amendment”). 
 375.  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (1978). 
 376.  It is for this reason that Professor C. Edwin Baker has argued that “a complete denial of 
first amendment protection for commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is required by, 
first amendment theory.”  C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of 
Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976).  Baker argues that speech is protected because it exists as 
“a manifestation of the self, and the self’s choices and commitments.”  Id. at 7.  “[H]ow ‘profit’ 
wants the world to be bears no necessary relation to how any individual wants it to be. To allow 
‘profit’ to vote is to depreciate human freedom.”  Id. at 15-16. 
 377.  Again, though, the point is not protecting “speech” as much as it is protecting the ability 
to speak if one so chooses.  Some have persuasively argued that, because of this, the autonomy 
model cannot alone support a free speech principle: if “choice” is ultimately the fundamental good, 
then the object of that choice can be speech or any other conduct.  Nothing sets speech apart.  See 
Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 479-80 (2011) 
(“From this perspective, the First Amendment ought to be interpreted as merely one instance of a 
1 - MORGAN FINAL 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:20 PM 
248 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:2 
about, then “all forms of expression are equally valuable for constitutional 
purposes,”378 because “the final end of the State [is] to make men free to 
develop their faculties.”379  Accordingly, some autonomy theorists have 
mounted attacks on the existing categorical exceptions.380 
But unlike the existing categorical exceptions, addictive expression 
literally corrodes self-realization381 and autonomy.  Indeed, this is its 
defining trait.  Speakers can rely on relatively simple and well-understood 
formulas to overbear, eventually, the will of some listeners, with assistance 
in most cases from a genetic predisposition for which the individual is 
undeniably not responsible.382 
Consider, briefly, an ad absurdum example borrowed from the pages of 
science fiction: a film that destroys its viewers’ interest in doing anything 
other than watching the film.  This is the titular plot device of David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest.383  But one need not delve into the world of science 
fiction to find such an example; this is also a description of the mechanisms 
of pornography addiction.384 
 
more general libertarian constitutional commitment.”).  Cf. Blocher, supra note 333, at 1449 
(“[N]early any act can be described as a manifestation of individual autonomy.”).  
 378.  Redish, supra note 373, at 595. 
 379.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 380.  See, e.g., Redish, supra note 373, at 626 (arguing that “fighting words should not be 
deemed constitutionally regulable per se”), 636-37 (suggesting that the obscenity exception is 
inappropriate because “it is not for external forces . . . to determine what communications or forms 
of expression are of value to the individual”), 644 (“[T]he self-realization principle allows us to 
fashion an arguable rationale for providing at least a certain level of first amendment protection 
even to wholly private defamations.”). 
 381.  See, Redish, supra note 373, at 593 (discussing what Redish sees as the difference 
between “self-realization” and “autonomy”).  For present purposes, what I have labeled 
“autonomy” encompasses both.  Cf. Blocher, supra note 333, at 1499 n.122 (noting distinctions 
within “autonomy” theory but collapsing them for sake of analysis). 
 382.  See Grant et al, supra note 56, at 6. 
 383.  DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, INFINITE JEST (1996).  See also Star Trek: The Next 
Generation, The Game (broadcast Oct. 28, 1991) (featuring an addictive video game that operated 
through stimulation of its users’ brains’ rewards circuitry and that quickly spread throughout the 
entire population of the USS Enterprise). 
 384.  See Love et al., supra note 195, at 412 (“[F]requent viewers of internet pornography 
require greater visual stimulation to evoke brain responses comparable to healthy controls or 
moderate porn users.”); Simone Kühn & Jürgen Gallinat, Brain Structure and Functional 
Connectivity Associated With Pornography Consumption, 71 JAMA Psychiatry 827, 828 (2017) 
(“The frequency of pornography consumption has been shown to predict various negative outcome 
measures in humans . . . .  [B]oys with daily consumption showed more interest in deviant and 
illegal types of pornography . . . .  [A]ccessing pornography online was predictive of compulsive 
computer use after 1 year.”). 
1 - MORGAN FINAL 11-14-19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2019  2:20 PM 
Winter 2020] ADDICTION AND EXPRESSION 249 
Science fiction authors have dealt for years (centuries, even385) with the 
possibility of speech that overrules free will,386 like visual or aural viruses 
that hijack a person’s brain.387  Legal scholarship, unfortunately, has not. 
For instance, Martin Redish, “the most prominent defender” of the 
autonomy theory,388 does not grapple with the possibility of speech that 
inherently precludes self-realization.  In the only exception he makes to the 
maxim that “all forms of expression are equally valuable for constitutional 
purposes,”389 Redish recognizes the possibility that perhaps a “primal 
scream” would be unprotected because it does not “develop human 
faculties.”390  But he quickly dismisses the question as “purely academic” 
because “it is difficult to conceive of a reason why the state would have an 
interest in regulating a primal scream.”391 
Others have noted, typically in a very cursory or preliminary manner, 
that there is little reason to protect involuntary hypnosis or subliminal 
advertising under the First Amendment.392  But courts have rarely had 
 
 385.  See generally MARK TWAIN, A LITERARY NIGHTMARE (THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
1857-1932) (1876) (featuring a memetic jingle (or an “earworm”) that infects its listeners).  
 386.  See Meme, ENCYC. OF SCIENCE FICTION (Aug. 12, 2018), http://www.sf-encyclope 
dia.com/entry/meme (“Sf [science fiction] and fantasy treatments generally amplify this 
propagational tendency into a compulsion, perhaps irresistible, which is experienced by the meme-
infected mind . . . .  [C]omplex sf memes behave like mind viruses or trojan programs.”). 
 387.  This is not so absurdum after all; code can already be visually stored in a QR code and 
executed through a smartphone’s camera.  “[E]xperts believe it’s just a matter of time before 
hackers are able to hijack” QR codes, causing them to run “a nasty virus, botnet, or malicious code 
that records your personal information, your location, even your bank account numbers.”  Staff, 
The Dark Side of QR Codes, CNET (July 3, 2012), https://www.cnet.com/news/the-dark-side-of-
qr-codes/.  As for now, the amount of code able to be visually stored in a QR code is too small to 
contain a virus, but QR codes can (and have been used to) automatically load a website which then 
downloads a malicious file onto a phone.  Denis Maslennikov, Malicious QR Codes Pushing 
Android Malware, KAPERSKY LAB (Sept. 30, 2011), https://securelist.com/malicious-qr-codes-
pushing-android-malware/31386/.  The idea of such a visual virus is explored in, among others, 
Hannu Rajaniemi’s excellent Quantum Thief trilogy, although what that virus did is too complicated 
to explain in a footnote. 
 388.  Blocher, supra note 333, at 1499. 
 389.  Redish, supra note 373, at 595. 
 390.  Id. at 629. 
 391.  Id. at 629, n.131. 
 392.  See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 437-38 
(2011) (suggesting that, under a thinker-based approach to the First Amendment, if evidence bore 
out that “popular conceptions” of brainwashing techniques “significantly obstruct or impair” 
rational decision-making, such speech would be more susceptible to regulation); Sunstein, supra 
note 335, at 606 (“Subliminal advertising and hypnosis, for example, are entitled to less than full 
first amendment protection.”), 608 (“Hypnosis, whether or not voluntary, does not amount to 
constitutionally protected speech, or to speech that is entitled to the highest level of first amendment 
concern; this conclusion holds even if the hypnotist’s message has some ideological dimension.”); 
but see Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. REG. 413, 442–49 (2015) (defending 
the ethical use of some forms of subconscious manipulation, although not hypnosis or subliminal 
advertising). 
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occasion to address these topics.393  The objections to addictive speech are 
simply stronger versions of the objections to hypnosis and subliminal 
advertising.  Like those forms of psychological manipulation, addictive 
speech “influences a person to belief or behavior by causing changes in 
mental processes other than those involved in understanding.”394  It “perverts 
the way that [a] person reaches decisions, forms preferences or adopts 
goals,”395 and, in so doing, “infringes upon the autonomy of the victim by 
subverting and insulting their decision-making powers.”396 
Perhaps, more starkly, addictive expression can be expressed as not 
unlike a tort: it literally reaches into the brains of its consumers and rewrites 
neural pathways.397  Indeed, compulsive pornography use is negatively 
associated with gray matter volume, functional activity, and connectivity in 
various parts of the brain, reflecting a “change in neural plasticity as a 
consequence of an intense stimulation of the reward system.”398 
It is not an answer to compare addictive expression merely to 
persuasion, which, can also influence its listeners’ activities.  “Every idea is 
an incitement,” and “[e]loquence may set fire to reason.”399  But the modern 
understanding of neurobiology means we do not need to be willfully blind to 
scientifically obvious differences.  Even in First Amendment scholarship, 
there has been a tendency to equate appeals to emotion as irrational, or 
somehow requiring a concession on the part of those who would restrict 
noncognitive speech.400  But this is an unnecessary concession for two 
reasons. 
First, the dichotomy between emotion and cognitive decision-making is 
nonexistent, i.e., emotional appeals are cognitive appeals.  We feel sadness 
and anger when we see children locked in cages at the border because we 
 
 393.  E.g., Vance v. Judas Priest, 1990 WL 130920, at *22–32 (D. Ct. Nev. Aug. 24, 1990) 
(finding no direct precedent on the question of whether subliminal messages were protected by the 
First Amendment, and concluding that they were not because they did not advance a purpose of 
protecting free speech, and because the individual’s speech and privacy interests in avoiding 
unwanted speech outweighed the interest in subliminal messaging); but see Waller v. Osbourne, 
763 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (implying that hidden messages are only unprotected to 
the extent the messages fit into a traditional categorical speech exception), aff’d 958 F.2d 1084 
(11th Cir. 1992). 
 394.  See RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 354-68 (1986) (defining psychological manipulation).  
 395.  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 377 (1985) (referring to manipulation). 
 396.  See T. M. Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUDIES 341, 351 (2013) 
(referring to manipulation). 
 397.  Grant et al., supra note 56, at 5-6. 
 398.  Kühn & Gallinat, supra note 384, at 827. 
 399.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 400.  See Sunstein, supra note 336, at 433 (“Moreover, much speech with noncognitive 
components is entitled to the highest degree of constitutional protection. Political speech, for 
example, frequently appeals to the heart as well as to the head.”). 
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understand the implications of those images.  We feel hope when a 
presidential candidate announces, “Yes, we can!” because we can 
hypothesize and imagine a world in which we, in fact, can.  Emotion is a 
central component of rationality;401 studies of patients who have had access 
to emotions inadvertently cut off have “demonstrated the integral role 
emotion plays in decision-making.”402  It is simply “not debatable” that “the 
dichotomous folk knowledge conception of emotion and cognition is 
inaccurate.”403 
Addictive speech, on the other hand, operates on the brain in virtually 
the same manner as addictive substances do.404  That is, it actively impedes 
decision-making.  Speech addicts, like substance addicts, “pathologically 
pursu[e] reward and/or relief,”405 resulting in “habit or compulsion . . . 
motivated less by positive reinforcement and more by negative 
reinforcement.”406  The defining feature of these addictions is that the 
manipulation of “the reward circuitry in human brains lead[s] to a loss of 
control.”407  Deleterious consequences to the addict follow.408 
Second, addictive expression is distinct from emotional appeals because 
of the intent of the speaker and listener.  As to the former, a person does not 
attend a political rally expecting a formal proof of the superiority of the 
politician’s platform, nor do they attend a showing of Moonlight expecting a 
dry lecture on the experience of gay Black adolescents.  One comes to 
experience the emotion; even when unexpected, it’s an understood feature of 
communication.  On the other hand, there is no meaningful way to consent 
to addiction, which by its nature obviates the concept of consent. 
And from the perspective of the speaker, emotional appeals can hardly 
be considered normatively illegitimate given the connection between 
emotion and rationality,409 not to mention the listeners’ assumed consent.  
And, critically, emotional appeals are, at least, an appeal to do something or 
to think or feel some way.  They are, at least, potentially transmissions of 
messages and ideology.  Addictive expression, on the other hand, is the 
 
 401.  See Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive 
Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact Statements, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1010-11 (2014) 
(“[T]here is widespread agreement that emotion and cognition are intertwined.  Emotion helps us 
screen, organize and prioritize the information that bombards us.  It helps us decide whether we 
care about what we are hearing, and it motivates us to act or refrain from acting.  It helps us 
understand and evaluate the intentions and motives of others and predict their future behavior.”). 
 402.  Id. at 1011. 
 403.  Id.  
 404.  See supra Part I.A.2. 
 405.  Public Policy Statement: Definition of Addiction, supra note 57. 
 406.  Grant et al., supra note 56, at 3. 
 407.  Love et al., supra note 195, at 388. 
 408.  Grant et al., supra note 56, at 3. 
 409.  See supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text. 
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intentional manipulation of neurological pathways (again, with a reliance on 
genetic predisposition) solely for the purpose of increasing consumption.  
Ideology or messaging, to the extent it exists in addictive speech, is 
transmitted through another feature of that speech; addicting speech is solely 
addicting. 
Accordingly, addictive expression not only fails to advance individual 
autonomy; it actively hinders self-realization, opening its “listeners” to 
manipulation, compelled by neurochemistry over which they have no 
conscious control.  Addictive expression is negative-value speech from the 
perspective of autonomy. 
ii. The Dysfunctional Marketplace of Ideas 
The second purposive theory of the First Amendment asserts that the 
Free Speech Clause exists to promote the discovery of “truth” through 
competition in the marketplace of ideas.410 The fundamental premise of the 
marketplace theory is that: 
 
[C]ompetition among ideas strengthens the truth and roots out error; 
the repeated effort to defend one’s convictions serves to keep their 
justification alive in our minds and guards against the twin dangers 
of falsehood and fanaticism; to stifle a voice is to deprive mankind 
of its message, which, we must acknowledge, might possibly be 
more true than our own deeply held convictions . . . .  Just as an 
unfettered competition among commodities guarantees that the 
good products sell while the bad gather dust on the shelf, so in the 
intellectual marketplace the several competing ideas will be tested 
by us, the consumers, and the best of them will be purchased.411 
 
The flaws in the metaphor are obvious—the idea that consumers always 
demand the “best” available speech is utterly without historical support,412 
and many other market-like factors further complicate the perfect 
neoclassical marketplace in the metaphor413—but so is its undeniable basic 
truth: public debate can and does frequently lead to social good. 
 
 410.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the First 
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, 
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself 
or a private licensee.”). 
 411.  ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 11-12 (1968). 
 412.  Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1130 (1979) (“It is 
naïve to think that truth will always prevail over falsehood in a free and open encounter, for too 
many false ideas have captured the imagination of man.  The zealot and the ideologue too often 
have overwhelmed the truth-teller.”). 
 413.  See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821 
(2008) (noting the role that “speech institutions” play in reducing transaction costs in the 
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Unsurprisingly, commitment to the marketplace theory can lead to 
different doctrinal outcomes than the autonomy theory.414  For instance, the 
search for truth is only facilitated through debate if the truth itself is 
uncertain.415  Accordingly, the marketplace theory might lead to the 
development of doctrine especially protective of political, moral, or religious 
speech; scientific and mathematical problems being less prone to resolution 
through debate.416  It is one thing for authorities “to embrace established 
scientific truths,” and quite another “to espouse political truths to the 
exclusion of alternative visions of politics.”417 
The most significant difference between the two theories is that the 
ultimate goal of the marketplace theory is not to protect a cognitive process, 
and instead to protect the outcome of that process.418  But, in that difference 
lies a similarity: the marketplace theory does not care if the outcome of the 
cognitive process is objectively “good” or “bad.”  Human diversity 
guarantees that some people will come to good opinions and others bad (and 
protecting speech, in turn, helps ensure that diversity).  As long as that mix 
of good and bad ideas exists, the marketplace theory posits that good ideas 
win out, and, in fact, will be strengthened through the legitimizing effects of 
surviving the crucible of public debate.419 
If even “bad” speech has its value in the marketplace of ideas, it might 
seem counterintuitive to argue that addictive speech undermines the search 
for truth.  But addictive speech is less like “good” or “bad” speech in the 
context of the marketplace of ideas than it is like the absence of speech.  It 
is an all-consuming noise, or a complete silence.  By virtue of the self-
reinforcing trait of tolerance,420 addictive speech crowds out both “good” 
speech and the valuable “bad” speech. 
 
marketplace of ideas); Darren Bush, The “Marketplace of Ideas”: Is Judge Posner Chasing Don 
Quixote’s Windmills?, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1114–16 (discussing possibility of monopolies in 
the marketplace of ideas).  
 414.  See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 270 (discussing the impact that the understanding of 
a constitutional right’s purpose can have on the doctrine that develops to enforce that right). 
 415.  FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 30-31 (1982). 
 416.  Id.; cf. Madison Malone Kircher, Can You Believe YouTube Caused the Rise in Flat-
Earthers?, N.Y. MAG (Feb. 19, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/can-you-believe-
youtube-caused-the-rise-in-flat-earthers.html (noting the recent rise in people professing to believe 
that the Earth is flat). 
 417.  Yudof, supra note 367, at 690.  
 418.  But see id. at 689-90 (recounting Frederick Schauer’s argument suggesting that the 
progress or truth theory “reduces itself to a preference for ‘a process of open discussion’ over other 
methods of decisionmaking” in the absence of independent criteria, which means that the truth 
theory is actually about valuing “democratic norms over other forms of governance, not objective 
truth over falsity”). 
 419.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also 
Redish, supra note 373, at 617 (noting the marketplace theory’s assumption that the expression of 
bad ideas “makes the truth appear even stronger by contrast”). 
 420.  See, e.g., Hellman et al., supra note 147, at 105. 
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In its place, addictive expression leaves a void.  Addictive expression 
does not even offer the benefit of making good speech look good by 
comparison.  Addictive speech beats good speech, and it does so by cheating: 
not through competing in the marketplace of ideas, but by operating outside 
of the marketplace, by bribing the brain with dopamine until the brain 
chooses the addictive expression.421  Addictive expression is message-less, 
yet voracious in demanding attention; a black hole into which intellectual 
bandwidth disappears. 
And because addictive expression avoids cognition, there is no 
argument against it.  To the extent that addictive expression is used to 
advance an agenda, perhaps surreptitiously, or perhaps overtly, it does not 
do so by insisting on the agenda’s merit or truth value.  The agenda is 
shielded from cross-examination.  Addictive expression circumvents debate; 
it does not play by the agreed-upon rules. 
As a result, addictive expression stifles innovation and the search for 
truth in the marketplace of ideas.  There is little reason to innovate beyond 
an intentionally addictive design, and all the motivation in the world to 
innovate to an intentionally addictive design. 
This effect can be empirically observed, as the Romans discovered 
millennia ago when games of chance crowded out games of skill in spite of 
the legal prohibitions against gambling.422  Today, in the form of the “loot 
box epidemic,” the video game industry’s marketplace of ideas is 
experiencing an updated version of the same dysfunction.423  The mechanics 
of loot boxes are inherently and intentionally addictive.424  And, as a theory 
of addictive speech might predict, despite nearly universal loathing by 
gamers, loot boxes are now ubiquitous.  The remainder of this part briefly 
recounts that history. 
Though they have their roots in the random-drop systems developed in 
MMORPGs425 the first true loot boxes emerged in the mid-to-late aughts in 
Asia.426  They migrated to American games in 2010.427  Today, they are 
unavoidable, and if they have missed anywhere, the Chief Operating Officer 
 
 421.  Hellman et al., supra note 147, at 106. 
 422.  See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
 423.  Drew Cartee, The Loot Box Epidemic in Modern Video Games, MEDIUM (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@dc99/the-loot-box-epidemic-in-modern-video-games-308ed8f73f38. 
 424.  See supra notes 175-86 and accompanying text. 
 425.  Nathan Lawrence, The Troubling Psychology of Pay-to-Loot Systems, IGN (Apr. 23, 
2017, 11:08 PM), https://www.ign.com/articles/2017/04/24/the-troubling-psychology-of-pay-to-
loot-systems.  One historical account of loot boxes traces them back to images in cigarette boxes, 
baseball card packs, and trading card games.  Steven T. Wright, The Evolution of Loot Boxes, PC 
GAMER (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.pcgamer.com/the-evolution-of-loot-boxes/.  For a description 
of the random-drop system in MMORPGs, see supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 426.  Wright, supra note 425. 
 427.  Id. 
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of Electronic Arts (“EA”), a gaming behemoth, has predicted that 
“ultimately, those microtransactions will be in every game.”428 
The story of microtransactions is a story of red lines repeatedly drawn 
and crossed, of gamers demanding that developers go no further, and 
developers ceaselessly pushing the limits of “acceptable” behavior.  It is the 
story of what happens when addiction corrodes a marketplace. 
Originally, and in the form considered by most gamers to be most 
“ethical,”429 microtransactions and loot boxes only were in free-to-play 
games, i.e., those that the consumer can download and play at no initial price, 
often released by independent studios.430  The microtransactions and loot 
boxes at first seemed like a win-win: a tax only on the willing,431 and free 
games for everyone else. 
But, soon, that line was crossed, and AAA games developed by the most 
commercially successful and critically acclaimed studios had 
microtransactions and loot box systems, frequently stacked on top of a full 
retail price (usually at least $60 in 2019).432  One analyst suggested that a 
third of EA’s annual sales—about $5 billion in 2018433—were from 
microtransactions.434 
Today, consumers attempt to enforce a new red line: items available for 
purchase with real money, either directly or through loot boxes and virtual 
currency, cannot provide a competitive advantage against other players in 
multiplayer, player-vs-player (PVP) games, i.e., there can be no “pay-to-
win.”435 
But this line, too, is a retreat from an earlier one that included as “pay-
to-win” items—like “experience boosters”—that reduced “grind” in 
cooperative or single-player games.436  Today, such “XP Boosters” are 
 
 428.  Stephen Totilo, The Strange, Scary, Fascinating, Exciting Future of Video Games, 
According to A Giant, KOTAKU (June 20, 2012, 9:00 AM), https://kotaku.com/the-strange-scary- 
fascinating-exciting-future-of-vid-5919847. 
 429.  Wright, supra note 425. 
 430.  Wright, supra note 425. 
 431.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 432.  Ex-Bioware Dev Traces Loot Boxes Back to Mass Effect 3 and FIFA, GAMASUTRA (Nov. 
14, 2017), https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/309644/ExBioWare_dev_traces_loot_boxes_ 
back_to_Mass_Effect_3_and_FIFA.php. 
 433.  Electronic Arts Inc., MARKETWATCH (last visited May 26, 2019), https://www.market 
watch.com/investing/stock/ea/financials. 
 434.  Tae Kim, ‘Loot Boxes’ Could Be Trouble for the Videogame Industry. Here’s What You 
Need to Know, BARRON’S (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.barrons.com/articles/videogame-publish 
ers-face-scrutiny-over-the-use-of-lock-boxes-51555120828. 
 435.  There are extensive debates about this definition.  See, e.g., /u/CherryDashZero, What is 
your definition for “pay to win”?, REDDIT (July 4, 2018), https://www.reddit.com/r/truegaming/ 
comments/8w417u/what_is_your_definition_for_pay_to_win/. 
 436.  See, e.g., /u/Redhavok, Comment to What is your definition for “pay to win”?, REDDIT 
(July 4, 2018), https://www.reddit.com/r/truegaming/comments/8w417u/what_is_your_ definition 
_for_pay_to_win/. 
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common in mobile games,437 and are beginning to appear in AAA single-
player or cooperative games, including bestsellers like Assassin’s Creed 
Odyssey,438 and, again, Destiny.439  The recently released Borderlands 3 
featured optional purchases for “mods”—modifications—that increase the 
rate of loot drops and experience gained.440  It should be no surprise that 
developers have made this choice; given the psychological effects of great 
loot drops and huge experience games, the effect of these boosts is to 
supercharge the game’s dopamine delivery systems.  Limbic capitalism, 
indeed.441 
The point here is not necessarily where the line is today, so much as it 
is to acknowledge that the red line is under continuous assault from 
developers seeking to create as many “recurrent consumer spending 
opportunities,”442 in industry-speak, as possible. 
The marketplace of ideas is the motivating mythology of the First 
Amendment, and elocutions of the marketplace sit atop the pantheon of 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Addictive speech consumes the market from 
the inside, and, accordingly, merits no First Amendment protection. 
iii. Addiction and Democracy 
The last of the standard explanations for the First Amendment is that it 
exists to enable and promote democratic self-governance through the 
Constitution’s representative system.443  The Free Speech Clause does so 
 
 437.  Andrei Klubnikin, Microtransactions In Games: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, 
GAME ANALYTICS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://gameanalytics.com/blog/microtransactions-games-goo 
d-bad-ugly.html. 
 438.  Chris Plante, Assassin’s Creed Odyssey’s Best Feature Costs an Extra 10 Bucks, 
POLYGON (Oct. 5, 2018, 8:18 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2018/10/4/17936292/assassins-cree 
d-odyssey-xp-boost-price.  But see Jason Schreier (@jasonschreier), TWITTER (Oct. 8, 2018, 1:36 
PM), https://twitter.com/jasonschreier/status/1049398247033372677?lang=en (“Assassin’s Creed 
Odyssey’s microtransactions are, at worst, annoying.  They’re not A CANCER ON THE VIDEO 
GAME INDUSTRY.”). 
 439.  Jamieson Cox, You Can Now Pay an Exorbitant Fee to Boost Your Level in Destiny, 
VERGE (Dec. 15, 2015, 9:40 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/12/15/10205490/destiny-the-
taken-king-level-boost-packs-microtransactions-bungie. 
 440.  Samuel Roberts, Here’s How Borderlands 3’s XP and Loot Drop Boost Mods Actually 
Work, PC GAMER, https://www.pcgamer.com/borderlands-3-loot-xp-boosts-explained/ (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2019). 
 441.  See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 442.  Alex Wawro, Take-Two Plans to Only Release Games With ‘Recurrent Consumer 
Spending’ Hooks, GAMASUTRA (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/309190/ 
TakeTwo_plans_to_only_release_games_with_recurrent_consumer_spending_hooks.php. 
 443.  See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the 
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 300 (“[T]he amendment in principle 
protects only ‘political’ speech—speech that participates in the processes of representative 
democracy . . . .”); see generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960). 
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directly—by literally enabling the debates necessary to provide voters with 
a meaningful choice in policies and candidates—and indirectly, by training 
citizens to be active participants in those debates, and to distinguish truth 
from fiction, and instill a sense of the value of debate.444 
The democracy theory cares both about the process and outcomes of 
cognition.  But, unlike the marketplace theory, it is not value-neutral.  
Instead, it posits that the First Amendment itself reflects an ideological 
preference for democratic self-governance, and that speech in furtherance of 
that ideology is more valuable than speech that denigrates it.  Thus, 
according to some, antidemocratic speech does not merit First Amendment 
coverage.445  Antidemocratic speech “is not aimed at a new definition of truth 
by a legislative majority,” and, therefore, “breaks the premises of our system 
concerning the way truth is defined.”446  Because those very premises are the 
reason for protecting speech, antidemocratic speech cannot merit 
protection.447  Other democratic theorists may recognize a preference for 
political speech,448 but nonetheless protect antidemocratic speech, relying on 
the marketplace of ideas to show the value of democracy over the long 
term.449 
In addition, there is also a split among democracy theorists regarding 
the legitimacy of the protection of non-political speech.  Bork argues that 
“[t]here is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of 
expression” than “speech that is explicitly political.”450  On the other hand, 
Mieklejohn would extend coverage to those “forms of thought and 
expression . . . from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, 
sensitivity to human values . . . which, so far as possible, a ballot should 
express,” including literature, the arts, the sciences, and philosophy.451 
 
 444.  See supra note 418 (recounting Frederick Schauer’s argument about the marketplace 
theory’s relationship to a preference for the “process” of debate and deliberation). 
 445.  Bork, supra note 443, at 29-30, 31; BeVier, supra note 443, at 309-11. 
 446.  Bork, supra note 443, at 31. 
 447.  Id. 
 448.  The rhetorical—and perhaps doctrinal—preference for political speech in First 
Amendment jurisprudence is the democracy theory’s most enduring impact.  See, e.g., Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40 (2010) (“Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for 
it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people . . . .  The First Amendment ‘has its fullest 
and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.’”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 449.  See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If, in 
the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be captured by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given 
their chance and have their way.”). 
 450.  Bork, supra note 443, at 20. 
 451.  Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 255-57. 
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Under either school of thought, the provision and consumption of 
addictive expression has added little, if any, value to democracy.  Of course, 
pornography and video games may contain political speech.  In fact, a great 
deal of criticism has been leveraged against each medium based on what is 
perceived as the medium’s dominant social or political messaging.452  But 
the question is not whether video games or porn should be protected at all, 
but whether a certain genre of speech sometimes contained within these 
mediums—addictive speech—is of value to democracy.  It is not. 
Focusing for now on expressly political speech—“speech about how we 
are governed”453—it is possible for speech to be both addictive and expressly 
political.  It would be a bizarre game, but one could imagine loot boxes that 
award campaign t-shirts for a virtual avatar or political bumper stickers for a 
virtual car.  Porn could feature actors portraying political figures, and making 
political jokes at their expense.454 
But addictive expression—even if nominally pro-democratic—is 
antidemocratic, because it is atomizing.  Addictive speech generates social 
isolation, while democracy requires a vibrant civil society.455  Already, 
sociologists frequently and increasingly assail the deterioration of American 
civil society at the hands of isolating vectors of addictive speech. 
Although pronouncements about the negative effects of entertainment 
mediums are as old as the mediums themselves, empirical research does 
provide some for concern.  One study found a “significant difference 
between the social skills of students addicted to computer games and normal 
 
 452.  See, e.g., Alfie Bown, Video Games are Political. Here’s How They Can Be 
Progressive, GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/games/20 
18/aug/13/video-games-are-political-heres-how-they-can-be-progressive (“[L]ike all art that 
arises from culture, games are deeply political.  They are also often biased . . . towards 
conservative, patriarchal and imperialist values such as empire, dominion, and conquering by 
force.”); see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Lecture, Pornography, Civil Rights, and 
Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
 453.  Bork, supra note 4443, at 27-8. 
 454.  See, e.g., Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 455.  See, e.g., Young African Leaders Initiative, U.S. State Dep’t, Civil Society: At the Core 
of Democracy and Human Nature, https://yali.state.gov/civil-society-at-the-core-of-democracy-
and-human-nature/ (“Civil society contributions to well-functioning governments are widely 
recognized among those who study those issues.”) (last visited May 27, 2019); Supporting Vibrant 
Civil Society & Independent Media, https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-
and-governance/supporting-vibrant-civil-society-independent-media (“A democratic political 
culture requires a vibrant civil-society sector . . . .”) (last visited May 27, 2019); MISSION OF 
NORWAY TO THE EU, Civil Society is Essential for Democracy, (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.norway.no/en/missions/eu/about-the-mission/news-events-statements/news2/-civil-
society-is-essential-for-democracy/ (“We cannot have a resilient democracy unless we can 
safeguard civil society in all countries, stated Ingrid Schulerud, deputy head of the Norwegian 
Mission to the EU, in her introduction.”). 
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students.”456  Video game addicts “displayed increased emotional difficulties 
including increased depression and anxiety, felt more socially isolated, and 
were more likely to display internet pornography pathological use 
symptoms.”457  A rash of commentary458 accompanied another study 
explaining that the “unusually large percentage of able-bodied men, 
particularly the young and less-educated” who were either not working or 
not working full-time459 could be explained: they were living with their 
parents and playing video games.460 
The study’s numbers are worth considering.  Employment rates for 
young men in their twenties, even after other groups rebounded from the 
Great Recession, remained about ten percentage points lower than they were 
in 2000.461  There was not a corresponding increase in school attendance.462  
Instead, the men were gaming.  Men in 2015 worked on average 132 hours 
less than men their age in 2007 worked, and reallocated almost the entire 
difference to leisure time.463  Three-quarters of the increase in leisure time 
went to gaming.464  Gaming alone, the study concluded, could be 
“responsible for about 23% to 46% of the decline in work hours for young 
men during the 2000s.”465 
Of course, over the same period, the nature of what it meant to “game” 
also changed.  The authors of the study noted that “improvements” in gaming 
over the same period included the “online video gaming, enhanced graphics, 
 
 456.  Eshrat Zamani et al., Comparing the Social Skills of Students Addicted to Computer 
Games with Normal Students, 2 J. ADDICTION & HEALTH 59, 62 (2010). 
 457.  Laura Stockdale & Sarah M. Coyne, VideoGgame Addiction in Emerging Adulthood: 
Cross-Sectional Evidence of Pathology in Video Game Addicts as Compared to Matched Healthy 
Controls, 225 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 265 (2018).  
 458.  See, e.g., Peter Suderman, Young Men Are Playing Video Games Instead of Getting Jobs. 
That’s OK. (For Now.), REASON (June 13, 2017), https://reason.com/2017/06/13/young-men-are-
playing-video-ga/; R.A., The Link Between Video Games and Unemployment, (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/03/30/the-link-between-video-games-
and-unemployment; Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Unexpected Economic Consequences of 
Video Games, VOX (July 7, 2017, 2:50 PM) https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/7/7/1 
5933674/video-games-job-supply. 
 459.  Ana Swanson, Study Finds Young Men Are Playing Video Games Instead of Getting Jobs, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 23, 2016, 1:45 PM) https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-video-
games-jobs-emploment-20160923-story.html. 
 460.  Erik Hurst, Video Killed The Radio Star, (Sept. 1, 2016) http://review.chicagobooth.edu 
/economics/2016/article/video-killed-radio-star. 
 461.  Id. 
 462.  Id. 
 463.  Brian Wallheimer, As Video Games Get Better, Young Men Work Less and Play More, 
CHICAGO BOOTH REVIEW (Dec. 20, 2017), http://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2017/artic 
le/video-games-get-better-young-men-work-less-and-play-more. 
 464.  Hurst, supra note 460. 
 465.  Fernández Campbell, supra note 458. 
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and the introduction of massive multiplayer games.”466  In other words, the 
games were becoming more addictive.467 
If young men today—increasingly unemployed, single, living with their 
parents, and spending increasing amounts of time on leisure—follow 
historical patterns, tremendous social consequences could follow, including 
higher rates of welfare use, substance abuse, and suicide.468 
It remains unclear whether a First Amendment jurisprudence fully 
devoted to the democracy theory would even cover most vectors of addictive 
expression to begin with.  But, to the extent it would, the intentional infliction 
of addiction promotes antisocial and therefore antidemocratic behavior.  
Combined with its self-replicating quality, it can, and has, had significant 
antidemocratic impacts.469  The promotion of democracy does not require the 
protection of addictive expression. 
2. Intentionally Addictive Expression is Similar to Other Categorical First 
Amendment Exceptions 
The preceding analysis relies on the assumption that regulators and 
courts can distinguish between categories of speech based on their First 
Amendment “value.”  That is, to say the least, a contested position, albeit 
one with a long history in First Amendment jurisprudence.  Beginning with 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court has said that some categories of 
speech are both: (a) “no[t] [an] essential part of any exposition of ideas,” and 
(b) “are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.”470  After Chaplinsky, the Court relied on this theory of low-
 
 466.  Mark Aguiar et al., Leisure Luxuries and the Labor Supply of Young Men, (June 21, 2017) 
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/maguiar/files/leisure-luxuries-labor-June-2017.pdf. 
 467.  See supra notes 154, 187-89, and accompanying text (describing addictive properties of 
online gaming); supra notes 174, 187-89, and accompanying text (describing addictive properties 
of MMOs in particular); supra notes 194-96 (discussing addictive “supernormal stimuli” effect of 
video game graphics).  Over the same time period, loot boxes were also introduced, and mobile 
games took off (the first iPhone was released in 2007).  See supra notes 425-28 (discussing spread 
of loot boxes in American games). 
 468.  Hurst, supra note 460. 
 469.  Id. 
 470.  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). 
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value speech to uphold restrictions on obscenity,471 child pornography,472 
libel,473 and commercial speech.474 
At the same time, the use of the theory has always “been marked by 
vacillation and uncertainty,”475 no doubt in part due to the serious objection 
of academics, who have called it “an embarrassment,”476 a “parody of free 
speech theory,”477 and “completely wrongheaded, if not incoherent.”478 
The Court’s response was, in United States v. Stevens, to reject the low-
value theory in favor of a “history and traditions” approach.479  Echoing a 
line from Justice Scalia’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court 
concluded that a cost-benefit analysis of categories of speech is foreclosed 
because such an analysis was already completed at the time of ratification.480  
Under the traditional approach, for a category of speech to be excluded from 
First Amendment coverage, it must have a “long history in American law” 
of being unprotected.481  New exceptions can only emerge in one of two 
ways: they can either be uncovered in the historical record or be drawn by 
analogies from existing exceptions.482 
 
 471.  Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-5 (1973) (defining obscenity as speech “lack[ing] 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957) (defining obscenity as speech “utterly without redeeming social importance”). 
 472.  New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1981) (stating that child pornography has 
“exceedingly modest, if not de minimis” value).  But see infra note 486 (discussing the Court’s 
revisionist history of Ferber in Stevens). 
 473.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact.”). 
 474.  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (stating that commercial 
speech stands in a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values”). 
 475.  Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 297, 298 
(1995). 
 476.  STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (Princeton 
Univ. Press 1990). 
 477.  Id. 
 478.  Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 552 (1989). 
 479.  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010). 
 480.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008) 
(rejecting an “interest-balancing” test for the Second Amendment because the Second Amendment, 
“[l]ike the First, . . . is the very product of an interest balancing by the people”). 
 481.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469. 
 482.  See id. at 471 (suggesting that Ferber’s decision rejecting constitutional protection for 
child pornography was generated by analogy from the “speech incident to criminal conduct” 
exception). 
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There are serious objections to the Stevens approach.483  Most 
significantly, “reasonable people disagree . . . about what traditions exist.”484  
And, of course, the Court has left some longstanding regulatory traditions, 
such as the doctrine of seditious libel, in the dustbin of history, which 
strongly indicates that something other than tradition is at play.  Therefore, 
given that the Court has conceded that its categorical coverage exceptions 
can be described as low-value speech,485 one may legitimately wonder 
whether the historical approach adopted in Stevens is revisionist,486 and 
whether some value-based distinctions are inevitable.487 
Despite the persuasive arguments against the historical approach 
adopted in Stevens, only Justice Alito has shown any interest in reviving the 
low-value theory.488  Accordingly, this section seeks to justify categorical 
exclusion for addictive expression by analogizing to the existing categorical 
exclusions, as Stevens suggests is required. 
In Stevens, the Court justified its child pornography jurisprudence by 
situating it as a permutation of the coverage exception for speech incident to 
criminal conduct.489  The Court noted that the market for child pornography 
was “intrinsically related” to the underlying child abuse; you could not have 
child pornography without sexual abuse of children, and child pornography 
could therefore be regulated without even implicating First Amendment 
 
 483.  Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech—And the Protracted 
Failure to Delimit the True Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 PACE L. REV. 1, 23 
(2016) (“[H]istory and tradition are hallmarks of conservative constitutional analysis, . . . [t]hus, 
some of the same criticisms that might apply to the use of history and tradition more broadly may 
apply with equal vigor to the First Amendment.”). 
 484.  Gregory P. Magarian, Symposium, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and 
Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1356 (2015). 
 485.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470–71. 
 486.  See Magarian, supra note 484, at 1356-57 (“Chief Justice Roberts in Stevens tied himself 
in knots explaining how tradition caused the Ferber Court to exclude child pornography from free 
speech protection, when Ferber really focused on the substantive harm of exploiting children.”). 
 487.  A value-based approach is also preferable.  The Court mostly subscribes to the agreed-
upon view that the First Amendment is instrumental, and exists to promote autonomy, truth, and/or 
democracy.  The traditional approach makes that principle irrelevant; it obviates doctrine that might 
seek to draw connections between categories of speech and the ends that the First Amendment 
serves.  This leaves First Amendment jurisprudence rudderless, with the Free Speech Clause unable 
to meaningfully adapt to serve its core interests in new contexts.  The values become mere 
background noise without any meaningful impact on doctrine.  See BeVier, supra note 443, at 300 
(“Recent commentators have begun to recognize explicitly that so long as first amendment values 
remain obscure, clarity will never emerge from first amendment analysis.”); Benjamin S. DuVal, 
Jr., Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to 
First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 164 (1972) (arguing that the First 
Amendment demands “a purpose-oriented rather than a rule-oriented approach”). 
 488.  See supra notes 363, 365 and 366 (quoting Justice Alito’s recent uses of the low-value 
approach); see also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 489.  Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471. 
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rights.490  An exception for addictive speech can emerge from the same sort 
of analogical process applied to the incitement exception. 
Speech is unprotected as incitement if it is “directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.”491  The incitement exception is premised on the idea that individual 
free will can be overborne; “[e]loquence may set fire to reason.”492  Speech 
is regulable, then, when it has a “chance of starting a present 
conflagration.”493  In less florid terms, the Court essentially examines three 
subjects: the speaker (whether the speech directed at inciting imminent 
lawless action); the message (whether the speech directed at inciting 
imminent lawless action); and the effect on the listener (whether the speech 
likely to produce imminent lawless action).  Taking each in turn, addictive 
expression presents a similar, strong case for noncoverage. 
As to the speaker, the incitement exception is targeted at the “wily 
agitator,” who induces “simple-minded” law-abiding persons into illegal 
action.494  The purveyor of addiction495 is not unlike the inciter.  This 
“addicter” seeks to set fire to reason, not through eloquence, but through 
manipulation of neurological phenomena over which his listeners have no 
active control.  Indeed, a great deal of addicters’ successes will rely on 
genetic factors in addition to the design of their products. 
Both the addicter and the inciter aim to overrule their listeners’ better 
judgments.  The difference between the two goes to the second factor—the 
message.  The inciter’s speech is directed at producing imminent lawless 
action, while the addicter’s speech is typically directed towards encouraging 
a lawful activity.  But all analogies have their natural limits;496 if the addicter 
sought to produce lawless action, he would by definition be an inciter.  It is 
enough that the addicter seeks to encourage problematic consumption, which 
the government may legitimately aim to discourage.  Because there is not a 
meaningful difference between the government discouraging illegal activity 
 
 490.  Id. 
 491.  Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 492.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 493.  Id. 
 494.  See Frederick Schauer, The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition (2005) 
(reviewing GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM), 57 STAN. L. REV. 2157, 2157 (2005). 
 495.  Let’s stipulate to the use of the term “addicter.” 
 496.  See Blocher & Morgan, supra note 270 (discussing the question of “what counts” in an 
analogy in the context of shifting constitutional doctrine); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 571, (1987) (“Think about why power tools are sold in hardware stores rather than in 
electrical appliance shops.  And think about why we most often group red bicycles with bicycles 
of other colors rather than with red ties and red meat.”). 
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and the government discouraging legal but socially undesirable activity,497 
addictive expression is relevantly analogous to the incitement exception in 
terms of the message expressed. 
The final factor used to analyze incitement is the effect on the listener.  
Only that speech likely to produce imminent lawlessness is uncovered as 
incitement.  Most troublesome for the analogy is incitement’s limiting 
principle of imminence. In Hess v. Indiana,498 the Court held that no liability 
could attach to the phrase, “We’ll take the fucking street later.”499  Who could 
know what is meant by “later”?  The imminence limitation is powerful, 
protecting intentional advocacy of deeply evil acts. 
An imminence requirement could never apply to addictive speech.  
Addictions—in particular, behavioral addictions—develop over time, 
through repeat exposure.  But this difference should not defeat the analogy.  
The imminence requirement is related to the nature of the harm of 
incitement—discrete incidents of usually violent lawbreaking.  A delay 
between the incitement and activity gives the inciter’s audience time to come 
to its senses or to be persuaded out of action.500  Indeed, if illegal action does 
not immediately follow the incitement, it is difficult to conclude that the 
audience has been “incited.” 
The opposite is true of addiction.  Imminence is not a concern; rather, 
the harm of addiction is the long-lasting impact of addiction on the individual 
and society.501  And there is no value in a cooling-off period.  One cannot be 
persuaded out of addiction.  Accordingly, the imminence requirement is best 
understood as inherently connected to the harm of incitement, and not a 
necessary feature of a successful analogy to an exception aimed at a different 
kind of harm.  Accordingly, a categorical exception for intentionally 
addictive speech can be drawn by analogy from the exception for incitement. 
Undoubtedly, there is no longstanding tradition of regulating addictive 
expression.  But there is a longstanding tradition of regulating addictive 
products, in ways that reflect the options that regulators today may consider 
to address this modern problem: laws that punish those who intentionally 
induce addiction, laws that prohibit minors from engaging in addictive 
activities or using addictive substances, or laws that ban the addictive activity 
or substance altogether.  These historical traditions were already old when 
 
 497.  Cf. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193 (1999) (“[T]he 
power to prohibit or to regulate particular conduct does not necessarily include the power to prohibit 
or regulate speech about that conduct.”). 
 498.  Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). 
 499.  Id. at 107. 
 500.  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there 
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes 
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency 
can justify repression.”). 
 501.  See supra Part I. 
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the Constitution was ratified.  Today, addiction comes in new packaging, and 
may otherwise be entitled to constitutional protection as speech.  The 
question is whether that should meaningfully change the government’s 
relationship to addiction, or whether First Amendment jurisprudence is truly 
flexible enough to handle the social problems posed by advancing 
technology. 
Conclusion 
Advances in our understanding of the brain have opened the door for 
predatory actors to take advantage of the brain’s more “hackable” systems—
especially its reward circuitry.  Today, professionals in a number of 
industries explicitly attempt to induce consumer addiction to their products 
and discuss publicly the best ways to do so. 
While scientists and medical professionals have begun to recognize the 
possibility of, and dangers posed by, behavioral addictions, constitutional 
scholars have not.  This may not seem strange at first—after all, the 
Constitution has little to do with neuroscience.  But vectors of addiction run 
the gamut from drugs and alcohol to gambling to video games and 
pornography.  In these latter vectors, constitutional questions emerge. 
Our First Amendment asks that we sacrifice—occasionally, a great 
deal—so that our collective speech can help individuals achieve self-
realization, so that we can progress towards truth through debate, and so that 
we can maintain a healthy system of democratic self-governance.  Addictive 
speech actively impedes each of these important goals.  There is no reason 
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